Seminar: "Committees with Leaks" by Dr. Saptarshi P. Ghosh
We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are `leaked' with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and a random probability of leakage is encountered. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.
Saptarshi P. Ghosh has completed his PhD in Economics from the University of Birmingham, UK. He has an MA in Economics from the Pennsylvania State University, USA and a Masters in Quantitative Economics from the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata. He is currently working as an Assistant Professor in the department of Economics at the Shiv Nadar University, in Delhi-NCR. Saptarshi’s research interests broadly lie in the areas of Game Theory, Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics, Political Economy and Public Policy. In particular, he is presently working on issues relating to: Information Theory, Institutional Design, Voting, and Consumer Herding.