

Agency, Mind and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

27th February – 1st March 2025

Conference Schedule

Thursday, 27th of February 2025

Venue: Lecture Hall No. 31, 3rd Floor, VMCC.

2:30 pm – 3:00 pm Registration

3:00 pm – 3:15 pm Inaugural Session

Inaugural Lecture

3:15 pm – 4:15 pm

Chair: P.R. Bhat, IIT Bombay

“Religion, Morals and Faith: An Alternative to Kant’s View”

Speaker: Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty, Presidency University

Individual Papers

4:15 pm – 5:00 pm

Chair: P.R. Bhat, IIT Bombay

“Kant, Persons and Value Realism”

Speaker: Apaar Kumar, Ahmedabad University

5:00 pm – 5:20 pm - Tea Break

5:20 pm – 6:20 pm

Chair: Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty

“Kant’s Moral Theory: Agency, Rationality and Freedom” (Online)

Speaker: R. C. Pradhan, University of Hyderabad

6:20 pm – 7:30 pm

Chair: Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty

“The Incomparable Value of the Individual” (Online)

Speaker: Christine Korsgaard, Harvard University

7:30 pm Dinner

Friday, 28th of February 2025

Venue: Lecture Hall No 31, 3rd Floor, VMCC.

[9:30 am – 1:20 pm: Parallel Sessions]

1:20 pm – 2:30 pm Lunch

2:30 pm – 3:15 pm

Chair: C.D. Sebastian, IIT Bombay

“Kantian Morality – Its Scope and Limits”

Speaker: Manidipa Sanyal, University of Calcutta

3:15 pm – 3:30 pm - Tea Break

Panel Session

3:30 pm – 5:30 pm

[Chair: Ranjan K. Panda, IIT Bombay]

3:30 pm – 4:10 pm:

“Constructivist Accounts of Normativity: A Critique”

Speaker: Sushruth Ravish, IIT Kanpur & Chaitanya Joshi, University of Hyderabad

4:10 pm – 4:50 pm:

“Why Poverty Must be Solved? – The Problem of Poverty by Kant” (Online)

Speaker: Saneyuki Yamatsuta, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business

4:50 pm – 5:30 pm:

“Can Kant Help us to Think of Property in the Digital World”

Speaker: Jaivir Singh, Jawaharlal Nehru University

5:30 pm – 5:45 pm Tea Break

Individual Paper

5:45 pm – 6:25 pm

Chair: Madhucchanda Sen, Jadavpur University

“Categorical Imperative: Kant’s Copernican Revolution in Ethics” (Online)

Speaker: Gopal Sahu, University of Allahabad

Saturday, 1st of March 2025

Venue: Lecture Hall No. 32, 3rd Floor, VMCC.

9:30 am – 10:15 am

Chair: Vikram Singh Sirola, IIT Bombay

“Kant and the Myth of the Given”

Speaker: Madhucchanda Sen, Jadavpur University

10:15 am – 11:00 am

Chair: Vikram Singh Sirola

“Kant’s Natural Law Casuistry”

Speaker: Hatch Chandler, Nazarbayev University

11:00 am – 11:15 am Tea Break

Panel Session 11:15 am – 1:00 pm

[Chair: Manidipa Sanyal, University of Calcutta]

11:15 am – 12:05 pm:

“Kantifying Animal Welfare”

Speaker: Antti Kauppinen, University of Helsinki

12:05 pm – 12:50 pm:

“The Ethics of Means and Ends: A Comparative Study of Gandhi’s Non-Violence Philosophy and Kant’s Deontological Ethics”

Namita Nimbalkar & Walter Dsouza, University of Mumbai

12:50 pm – 2:30 pm Lunch

[For 1st of March 2:30 pm – 5:15 pm: Parallel Sessions]

Parallel Sessions

Session I (28th Feb 2025)

Agency, Mind, and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Theme: Ethics and Moral Philosophy

Venue: Seminar Room No. 13, VMCC

Time: 9:30 am – 1:20 pm

Chairperson: Vikram Singh Sirola, IIT Bombay

Moderator: Huma Namal

9:30 -9:55 am	A Critical Examination of F.H. Bradley's Critique of Kantian Ethics	Ramesh Dheeravath, University of Allahabad
9:55 – 10:20 am	Dignity of Man: A Critical Reflection in Kant's Ethics.	Bijay Kumar Nayak, IIT Bombay
10:20 – 10:45 am	Foreclosure of Moral Exceptions in Kant's Deontology.	Samaya Padhi, IIT Bombay
10:45 – 11:00 am	Tea Break	
11:00 – 11:25 am	Moral Agency in the Dream State: A Kantian Perspective	Ayush Srivastava, IIT Bombay

11:25- 11:50 am	Moral Perfection in Kantian Ethics: Objection from Demandingness	Nupur Rana, University of Edinburgh
11:50 – 12:15 pm	Rational Will and Causal Order: Kant's Answer to the Autonomy Paradox	Nabanita Das, IIT Bombay
12:15 – 12:30 pm	Tea Break	
12:30 – 12:55 pm	Kant Deontology: A Naturalistic Re- evaluation through Empirical Reliability and Realistic Lens	Suvodeep Mukherjee, Presidency University
12:55 – 1:20 pm	Kantian Ethics and the Challenge of Ethical Relativism	Abhinav Kumar, JNU

Parallel Sessions

Session II (28th Feb 2025)

Agency, Mind, and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Theme: Metaphysics and Epistemology

Venue: Seminar Room No. 14, VMCC

Time: 9:30 am – 1:20 pm

Chairperson: Ranjan K. Panda, IIT Bombay

Moderator: Goutam M

9:30 -9:55 am	The notion of transcendental in Kant and Husserl: A Critical Analysis	Saurabh Todariya, IIIT Hyderabad
9:55 – 10:20 am		
10:20 – 10:45 am	Spontaneity, Receptivity, and Consciousness: Revisiting Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception	Vijaya Runchu Choudhary & Ranjan K. Panda, IIT Bombay
10:45 – 11:00 am	Tea Break	
11:00 – 11:25 am	Against Transparency: Kant's Critique of Introspection and the Case for Inferential Self-Knowledge	Prateek Chaubey, IIT Bombay

11:25- 11:50 am	Quid Juris: Kant and Maimon on the Nature and Intelligibility of Experience	Arnav Madhav, JNU
11:50 – 12:15 am	Agency within the Bounds of Sense: An Analysis of Strawson’s Appropriation of the Kantian Transcendental Subject	Gayatri Giri, IIT Bombay
12:15 – 12:30 pm	Tea Break	
12:30 – 12:55 pm	Kant and the Euthanasia of Pure Reason: Remarks on Exigency of Thought	Arundhati Dubey, IIT Bombay
12:55 – 1:20 pm	Intelligibility in Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science	Siddhant Khamkar, IIT Bombay

Parallel Sessions

Session III (28th Feb 2025)

Agency, Mind, and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Theme: Kant and the Continental Tradition

Venue: Seminar Room No. 15, VMCC

Time: 9:30 am – 1:20 pm

Chairperson: Siby K. George, IIT Bombay

Moderator: Muzaffar Abass Wazir

9:30 -9:55 am	The Paradox of Telling Lies and Speaking Truth; Experiments with Kantian Moral Laws	Manas Jyoti Deka, University of Allahabad
9:55 – 10:20 am	The Ethical Void: Freedom, Guilt and Excess from Kant to Post Phenomenology	Shivanshi Trivedi, IIT Bhubaneswar
10:20 – 10:45 am	Study of Differential Ontology: A Transcendental Empirical Critique of Phenomenology	Nancy Yadav, JNU

10:45 – 11:00 am	Tea Break	
11:00 – 11:25 am	Morality, Agency, and Action: From Kant to Hegel (and Back?)	Rutwij Nakhwa, IIT Bombay
11:25- 11:50 am	Reconsidering Ability: A Kantian-Phenomenological Approach to the Ethics of Disability	Naveen Kumar, JNU
11:50 – 12:15 am	Embodied Freedom: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Gender through a Phenomenological-Kantian Lens	J Manimekhla, JNU
12:15 – 12:30 pm	Tea Break	
12:30 – 12:55 pm	Kantian Phenomenology, Subjectivity and Embodiment	Simran, Sir Parshurambhau College
12:55 – 1:20 pm	Moral Struggle and Agency: Reassessing Kantian Ethics in the Context of Transhuman Moral Beings	Payel Basak & Sreetama Misra, IIT Bhubaneswar

Parallel Sessions

Session IV (1st March 2025)

Agency, Mind, and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Theme: Social and Political Philosophy

Venue: Lecture Hall 32, VMCC

Time: 2:30 pm – 5:15 pm

Chairperson: Apaar Kumar, Ahmedabad University

Moderator: Siddhant Khamkar

2:30 -2:55 pm	Reason, Truth and Rights: A Critical Reading of Kant and Rorty	Rahul Maurya, BHU
2:55 – 3:20 pm	Global Injustice and Shared Responsibility: Exploring the Interplay between Iris Marion Young and Immanuel Kant	Aditi, JNU
3:20 – 3:45 pm	Reframing Poverty Alleviation: Engaging Kantian Ethics and Iris Marion Young's Social Connection Model	Arif Guljar, IIT Bombay
3:45 – 4:00 pm	Tea Break	
4:00 – 4:25 pm	Kant's External Freedom and the Principle of Publicity	Henry Vumjou, Krea University
4:25- 4:50 pm	Motivations and Foundations: Hume and Kant on Morality – A Study of Political Finance in India	Akash Singh & Kriti Dwivedi, IIT Madras
4:50 – 5:15 pm	Capitalism, Development, and Justice: Reflections from Kant and Contemporary Moral Thinkers	Satyabrata Biswas, IIT Madras

Parallel Sessions

Session V (1st March 2025)

Agency, Mind, and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Theme: Applied Ethics

Venue: Seminar Room No. 13, VMCC

Time: 2:30 pm – 5:15 pm

Chairperson: Pravesh G. Jung, IIT Bombay

Moderator: Prateek Chaubey

2:30 -2:55 pm	Understanding AI Ethics in the Lens of Kantian Deontology	Iyarana Sarkar & Rajakishore Nath, IIT Bombay
2:55 – 3:20 pm	Examining Kant’s Contribution to Medical Ethics: A Critical Reflection	Abhijit Tarafdar, Presidency University
3:20 – 3:45 pm	Exploring Ecological Agency in Kant’s Philosophy	Akanksha Prajapati & Rajakishore Nath, IIT Bombay
3:45 – 4:00 pm	Tea Break	
4:00 – 4:25 pm	Free Will and Human Actions Today: Contrasting Kantian Ethics in Modern Aspect	Aishwarya Dingre & Sayli Mukund Deshmukh Banaras Hindu University
4:25- 4:50 pm	Kantian Autonomy in the Age of Climate Crisis: Reconciling Individual Agency and Collective Moral Responsibility	Harshita Tripathi, JNU
4:50 – 5:15 pm	Rethinking Anthropocentrism: Extending Kant's Moral Imperative on Climate Change	Nidhi Maurya & Sayantika Adhikary, BHU

Parallel Sessions

Session VI (1st March 2025)

Agency, Mind, and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Theme: Kant and Other Traditions

Venue: Seminar Room No. 14, VMCC

Time: 2:30 pm – 5:15 pm

Chairperson: Mrinal Kaul, IIT Bombay

Moderator: Pranjal Giri

2:30 -2:55 pm	Universality and Particularity: A Comparative Analysis of Kantian Ethics and Naga Tribal Values	Kevezai Tureng, Nagaland University
2:55 – 3:20 pm	A Comparative Study Between Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer: The Influence of Transcendental Idealism on Will and Representation	Upama Sarkar, Presidency University
3:20 – 3:45 pm	Kant and the Question of Animal: A Jain Perspective	Maharnav Singhal, IIIT Hyderabad
3:45 – 4:00 pm	Tea Break	
4:00 – 4:25 pm	The Kantian Interpretation of Nāgārjuna: A Critique	Kalparnab Gupta, IIT Bombay
4:25- 4:50 pm	Kant's Aesthetic Realm and the Emergence of Aesthetic Perception in Merleau-Ponty	Darshna Kumar, IIT Gandhinagar
4:50 – 5:15 pm	Is Kant's Notion of Enlightenment Really 'enlightening' for an Individual?	Amit Kumar Chourasia, University of Hyderabad

Parallel Sessions

Session VII (1st March 2025)

Agency, Mind, and Value: Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Theme: Psychology, Logic, Cognitive Science

Venue: Seminar Room No. 15, VMCC

Time: 2:30 pm – 5:15 pm

Chairperson: Ratikanta Panda, IIT Bombay

Moderator: Vijaya Runchu Choudhary

2:30 -2:55 pm	Application of Kantian Deontology in Everyday Life: Possibility and Challenges	Barada Laxmi Panda, Presidency University
2:55 – 3:20 pm		
3:20 – 3:45 pm	Kant and Dynamic System Theory: Exploring the Notion of Purpose and Autonomy in a Self-Organized System	Huma Namal, IIT Bombay
3:45 – 4:00 pm	Tea Break	
4:00 – 4:25 pm	On the Question of Reducibility of Arithmetic to Logic: The Philosophical Perspective of Kant and Frege	Sumit Pandey & Ranjan K. Panda, IIT Bombay

Certificate distribution and high tea after 5:15 pm. That will conclude the event.

Celebrating the 300 Years of Philosophy of Kant

Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty, Presidency University

Title: Religion, Morals, and Faith: An Alternative to Kant's View

It is well-known that Kant was critical of the arguments designed to prove the existence of God. For Kant, religion, at best, helps us defend our ethical practices. The idea of God is a problematic assumption of our moral life. Moral progress is all that matters and religion is felt as necessary for making sense of our ethical life. In the present paper, I would like to propose, contrary to Kant, that morals do not form the essence of religion. Faith is the core of religion and an attempt to defend/refute the arguments for the existence of God misses the spirit of religious aspiration in humans. Morals could be an important corollary of religion, but it is not the essence of religion. Faith, both as a means and as an end, regulates a religious person. The fact that faith confines itself to the contribution of the individual ignoring the contribution of the object does not make it any less important. Faith might not yield knowledge, depending on what one means by 'knowledge', nonetheless faith defines the religious attitude of a person.

Apaar Kumar, Ahmedabad University

Title: Kant, Persons and Value Realism

Kant claims that persons have absolute value, i.e., a dignity beyond all price. I inquire into the conception of "value" presupposed in the claim that persons have absolute value. Specifically, I ask if persons can be considered mind-independently valuable in Kant's ethical system. Since Kant does not himself address this question, I draw on an existing debate on whether Kant is a value realist or a value constructivist. The value realists take moral truths to be mind-independently real while the value constructivists view them as mind-dependent. I ask whether, if we assume the value realist view to be correct, the mind-independent value of the moral law also entails the mind-independent value of persons. I argue that even if we take the moral law to be mind-independently valuable, persons as metaphysical entities may be construed as mind-dependent,

and so the mind-independent value of the moral law need not entail that value in the “absolute value” of persons is mind-independent.

R.C. Pradhan, University of Hyderabad

Title: Kant’s Moral Theory: Agency, Rationality and Freedom

In this paper I intend to focus on the centrality of agency, rationality, and freedom to Kant’s moral theory. Kant’s transcendental moral theory makes the following assumptions:

1. The moral law demands the primacy of the practical reason and the rationality of the moral agent whose will is determined by the practical reason.
2. Moral agency cannot be secured in the empirical world as it is real only in the trans-empirical noumenal world.
3. Freedom of the moral agents is possible only in the transcendental intelligible world.
4. Rationality along with freedom is a transcendental notion which can be understood only in the light of the idea of practical reason.

Kant’s deontic moral theory makes a radical departure from the empiricist ethics of his time by freeing ethical values and virtues from the stranglehold of the ethics of pleasure and self-love. By liberating moral agency from the causal nexus of the empirical world, Kant has made ethics free from the vagaries of the self-driven values of personal interests and has placed it in the realm of universal values of freedom and moral perfection. The universal moral law defines the sphere of obligations or duties to be undertaken by the moral agents in fulfilment of the larger goal of establishing the kingdom of ends on the earth. Ethics, for Kant, is the universally acceptable plan of making human beings citizens of the moral commonwealth.

Christine Korsgaard, Harvard University

Title: The Incomparable Value of the Individual

Kant believed that every human being should be treated as an end in itself. In the *Groundwork*, Kant explains many of our duties by arguing that their violation would involve treating a human being as a mere means. But we cannot explain all of our duties that way. Nor can we explain what is wrong with treating an individual as a mere means unless we have a positive account of what is involved in being an end in itself. Kant does not spell out this positive account. I find a clue to what Kant could mean in his claim that individuals who possess dignity have incomparable value. I propose that to treat someone as an end in itself is to evaluate the events and conditions of that person's life in accordance with the value they have for her, and to regard that value as incomparable with the value those events and conditions might have for anyone else. I explain why this conception rules out the aggregation of value across the boundaries between individuals and show how it supports John Taurek's attack on aggregation. I also explain how this conception of the value of the individual is connected to the idea that individuals have rights.

Manidipa Sanyal, University of Calcutta

Title: Kantian Morality – Its Scope and Limits

Immanuel Kant is a revolutionary thinker in all major fields of philosophy during the eighteenth century. In the present paper, I intend to discuss Kant's theory of morality and relevance of Kantian morality in the present-day world. Kant assumed some supposed objections to the necessity of a priori part of pure material moral philosophy and responded to them. The two Kantian reasons in favour of pure a priori part of ethics are motives of speculation and purity of morality. Now, every voluntary action is judged by its motive. When motive is empirical, then the corresponding action is not a moral action, because the motive involves the idea of the result which comes from experience. The motive of a moral action, on the other hand, is not empirical. It is good will. Goodness of a good will lies in the goodwill itself, and not in the result. It is the sense of obligation that makes people stick to good will and fight internally with the sensuous desires which play as obstacles in the path of morality. It is for this reason that moral actions, in human life, appear as duties, i.e., as an action that

ought to be done by countering obstacle, if any. The objective principle is a command which is categorical in nature, as distinct from being hypothetical. according to Kant, to act for the sake of moral law is also to act out of reverence for the law. Here a man recognizes that the law is binding. It may appear that an action, which is done for the sake of moral law, ceases to be moral if it is accompanied by pleasure or even by a desire of pleasure. The action, in this case, does not cease to be moral even accompanied by pleasure, because neither the presence nor the absence of pleasure can affect the moral worth of the action. Kant introduced three major formulations for understanding the categorical imperative, which are very important to understand his moral theory. Is Kant's theory relevant for today, when ethics is viewed from different perspectives? We can say that moral actions are done by human beings, who is fully aware, not only of other fellow beings, but also of animals and the environment. Hence Kant's moral theory can be extended further without affecting or altering his fundamental moral thought.

But, as we all know, this world of the twenty-first century has witnessed massive technological advancements that include innovations in travel, production of goods, communications and social relations. There is however evidence of striving for power, love and wealth and over and above evidences of inhumanity. Abuse of the means of communication and war have affected the morality of people. So, the present world faces problems of war, murder, and disaster. How can such problems be solved? Can the philosophy of Kant still be viewed as relevant?

In Kant's moral theory, The universal form of categorical imperative takes no note of temporality in a particular situation. Now, an action is done at a particular time, and the element of time plays an important role in the performance of the action. Different literature shows that thinkers focus upon the interrelation between time and ethics. Hans Jonas wrote about a temporal perspective of ethics in his concept of responsibility. Under the influence of Paul Ricoeur's writings, Jan Sokol's book discusses about apprehending time in various sciences and philosophy. His writing *Ethics & Time* portrays an original temporal perspective on ethics. This concept is absent in modern logic, and according to Sokol, it is perhaps due to the influence of Kant.

To be more specific, Sokol gives importance to the dimension of responsibility of the moral agent. According to Bonhoeffer also, good intention is not sufficient for a truly moral act because responsibility of the agent proves the morality of the action in the true sense.

According to Bonhoeffer, uncertainty, chance are elements which cannot be fully eliminated from human actions, not even from moral actions. Experience reveals that often it is not one's conscience to follow the law of truthfulness, but one's free conscience that guides a man to remain far from truthfulness in order to save a person's life. In fact, Kant speaks of truthfulness in general in a case, but not in a situation. Even after considering these important factors we however must conclude that Kantian theory involves the most influential constituents of morality.

Sushrurth Ravish, IIT Kanpur & Chaitanya Joshi, University of Hyderabad

Title: Constructivist Accounts of Normativity: A Critique

The genesis of Constructivism in metaethics as an alternative to moral realism on the one hand and expressivism on the other can be traced back to Kant's demarcation of practical and theoretical viewpoints. Viewing ourselves from a practical standpoint, we can project values and make normative judgments. Constructivism argues that normative claims are rendered true by virtue of being entailed from within the practical point of view. While Kantian constructivism claims that the practical standpoint entails substantive, recognisably moral standards, Humean constructivists offer a strictly formal characterisation. Sharon Street has argued for the superiority of Humean Constructivism and claimed that it alone has satisfactory responses to the questions of how moral judgments can fit with a naturalistic view of the world without compromising the inherent normativity embedded in them. Street has increased the stakes of the debate by claiming that truths about epistemic reasons also depend on the agent's (or anyone else's) attitudes. However, we believe there are inconsistencies in Street's unified constructivist account of practical and epistemic normativity. We highlight two major worries. First, Street's framework, in her own words, is not a restricted but a thoroughgoing constructivism, following which a 'moral mistake', for her,

could only be committed in terms of internal inconsistency of values. In our opinion, this unfairly exonerates the first radical value choice made from a practical standpoint. Second, Street's account allows for wholesale value revision, according to which individuals would have complete liberty to change their values whenever there is a need for consistency, leading to temporal unpredictability. We try to show that there is no good way for Humean metaethical constructivists (like Street) to allay these concerns and that Kantian metaethical constructivists have some resources to respond to Street's challenges.

Saneyuki Yamatsuta, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business

Title: Why Poverty Must be Solved? – The Problem of Poverty by Kant

In the Doctrine of Right of Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims the right of government to remedy the poverty through taxation. However, it is disputed in what ground Kant argues for the state's duty to support the poor. Besides, it is not clearly stated that the poverty itself is the problem to be solved. However, there are texts which state that the poverty is the problem of the whole civil society to be solved. In the Doctrine of Virtue and the Lecture of Ethics from 1770s, Kant claims that the duty of beneficence must be understood not as "meritorious duty," but rather as "duty of indebtedness." The reason for this is that the act of beneficence presupposes the inequality of wealth, which is the result of the "general injustice" of civil society. People in civil society, although they live lawfully, can take part in this "general injustice," so that their beneficence is the act of "reparation" for this previously committed injustice. Through this logic, Kant attributes the cause of poverty to the whole civil society which must be relieved.

Jaivir Singh, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Can Kant help us to think of property in the digital world?

As we hurtle towards an increasing digital presence, many questions arise about the nature and content of this presence and among them are questions about the ownership of data...who owns the data and on what grounds? I suggest turning to Kant to help us reflect on these issues. However this is not an unexacting task since many interpretations of Kant's theory of property see it rooted in the historical moment that Kant was writing. This may partially be so but such

emphasis takes away from the core features of Kant's interaction between property, law and morals that allowed him to navigate between the internal (noumena) and external (phenomena) worlds in this context. In the digital world something of mine goes out to the external world, thus the paper hopes to explore property by analogy through a Kantian reflection the connections between the external and internal spheres where the empirical or phenomenal world has shifted to form a new (?) configuration. The paper is basically an attempt to speculate about a possible theory of property extracted with an engagement with Kant, which may allow us to reflect on the possibilities of governance of the digital world.

Gopal Sahu, University of Allahabad

Title: Categorical Imperative: Kant's Copernican Revolution in Ethics

The paper presents and examines Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative as a manifestation of a "Copernican Revolution" in ethics. Drawing parallels with his epistemological revolution, where the mind structures knowledge starting from percept to synthetic a priori knowledge through form of intuition, categories, unity of apperception, this paper argues that Kant's morality arises not from external sources like divine command or empirical consequences (Hume's sentimentalism, consequentialism), but from the internal structure of reason from the Goodwill to categorical imperative through maxims of duty. This shift emphasizes autonomy, the capacity for self-governance, as the cornerstone of ethical action. The Categorical Imperative, with its formulations of universalizability, humanity as an end in itself, and the kingdom of ends, provides a universal and objective foundation for moral law, transcending individual desires and social conventions. By grounding morality in reason, Kant's categorical imperative addresses the "is-ought" problem explaining how moral "ought" can be derived from the structure of reason itself, rather than from empirical observations. This Kantian-Copernican revolution in ethics has profound implications for understanding moral agency, with respect to autonomy, moral responsibility, value, and normativity, establishing a framework for ethical action based on reason, duty and respect for all persons

Madhucchanda Sen, Jadavpur University

Title: Kant and the Myth of the Given

In this paper we address the enduring philosophical question of whether we can know the external world and how such knowledge is possible. It examines the interplay between metaphysical and epistemological skepticism, focusing on the critique of traditional empiricism and its reliance on the “Myth of the Given.” We place this entire issue in the backdrop of Kantian explanation of empirical knowledge and discuss the post Kantian response to it. In doing so I discuss specifically Davidson and McDowell.

Donald Davidson’s coherence theory, which rejects the foundationalist approach by denying the scheme-content dualism and the justificatory role of “the Given.” Davidson argues that coherence within a belief system ensures truth and correspondence with reality, challenging the empiricist reliance on non-conceptual foundations.

John McDowell extends this critique by reviving Kantian insights into empirical knowledge. He emphasizes the inseparability of the faculties of receptivity and spontaneity, asserting that experiential intake already has conceptual content. McDowell rejects the dualistic opposition between scheme and content, proposing a model where the conceptual and experiential work together to justify empirical knowledge. This synthesis addresses skepticism while avoiding the pitfalls of traditional empiricism and coherence theories.

I do believe that Kant’s framework, as reinterpreted by McDowell, offers the most compelling account of empirical knowledge by integrating external rational constraints and conceptual capacities. This approach provides a balanced resolution to the challenges posed by the “Myth of the Given” and skepticism. However how would Kant respond to our empirical knowledge of our mundane self, ourselves as persons? This is the question I raise and try to at least understand the ways in which this may be answered.

Title: Kant's Natural Law Casuistry

Many Kantians are not merely unpersuaded by Kant's Groundwork arguments against suicide; they have a hard time understanding how the arguments are supposed to work. One common complaint about Kant's first Groundwork argument is that it appeals to natural purposes. The appeal to natural purposes seems to conflict with Kant's core thought that reason gives itself the moral law autonomously, and hence is not bound by any purposes nature may have intended. The easiest way to solve the problem, some commentators suggest, is to suggest that Kant failed to grasp the full implications of his view, and in groping for justifications for the attitudes of his day, he carelessly slipped into natural law casuistry. On the contrary, I will argue that Kant's position on suicide in fact fits very naturally with his core commitments regarding morality. I endeavor to show why Kant feels entitled to invoke teleological casuistry in arguing for the duty not to commit suicide. I argue that Kant's argument for the Formula of Natural Law in fact justifies him in invoking the idea of a natural purpose in some situations. The key to understanding why Kant is entitled to invoke natural purposes in some casuistical contexts lies in his assertion of a connection between the laws of a thing's nature and its existence. Humans continue to exist only if the laws of their nature are adequate to keep them alive in their environment. They will only insofar as they are alive. Hence, I could not consistently will today a law of human nature that is incompatible with human survival. For if such a law were a law of human nature, then humans would have died out before I ever came to exist. Hence, I would not exist. Hence, I could not will the law. So it is contradictory to imagine my willing the law as a law of nature. The use of natural teleology in moral reasoning is justified because the laws that explain the continued existence of humans are teleological. We do not grasp why humans—or any biological organism—survives without applying teleological concepts. Any natural teleology that is essential to our survival is one that we ought not will to oppose, for to will against such a natural purpose is to will according to a principle that we could not will to be a universal law, for such a universal law would conflict with our existence, and hence, with our willing it.

Antti Kauppinen, University of Helsinki

Title: Kantifying Animal Welfare

Animal lives matter. That's why, in many decision contexts, we need to take into account the consequences of our actions for the well-being of animals who are affected by them, as well as human well-being and other moral considerations. In practice, to do this properly, we need to quantify animal welfare somehow, so that we can weigh it against human welfare, the welfare of other animals, and other morally relevant considerations. Recently popular attempts aim to quantify animal welfare by estimating how much welfare members of different species are capable of enjoying in comparison to humans. We will propose an alternative picture whose key element is that in calculating the moral value of outcomes, we need to weigh the welfare of animals by their individual intrinsic moral importance or worth, so that a welfare benefit to a member of one species may have a different moral value than an equal welfare benefit to a member of a different species. Intrinsic moral importance, in turn, is based on degree of capacities for free agency. This quasi-Kantian reconceptualization yields a conception that avoids important challenges to the existing views while also making use of much of the same scientific information to arrive at principled views about the moral value of welfare gains or losses to different animals.

Namita Nimbalkar & Walter Dsouza, University of Mumbai

Title: The Ethics of Means and Ends: A Comparative Study of Gandhi's Non-Violent Philosophy and Kant's Deontological Ethics

The philosophies of Mahatma Gandhi and Immanuel Kant focus on the moral principles that link the concept of means and ends as dealt with in the article. Both the philosophers inspite of the cultural and intellectual differences propose a critique on utilitarian ethics. They advocate an ethical morality inspite of their outcomes. The paper conducts a comparative analysis demonstrating the convergence of Gandhi's Nonviolent philosophy and Kant's Deontological ethics in their emphasis on the intrinsic moral significance of means, rather than viewing them just as tools for attaining an objective. The ideals of Mahatma Gandhi revolve around the principles of non-violence (ahimsa) and truth (satya) which for him were essential for the moral structure of society and spiritual development of an individual. He dedicated himself to non-violence that transcended political

activism and sought to bring about a link between acts and moral principles for an individual as well as the society. Immanuel Kant's deontological ethics suggests that every moral action is associated with duty irrespective of its results. Kant's categorical imperative suggests that acts should be governed by principles that can be universally applicable, honouring the autonomy and dignity of all rational agents. Both Immanuel Kant and Gandhi, emphasize the importance of moral principles and the necessity to uphold them. The comparative examination of Gandhi and Kant explicate the common ground of ethical necessity above material worry. Both of them say that the moral value of methods is an important part of acting in an ethical way. Gandhi's focus on nonviolence as a universal principle is similar to Kant's assertion that there are universal moral rules that say actions must respect the dignity of each person and fulfil their duties. Both dismiss the utilitarian rationale for employing detrimental methods to attain favourable outcomes. The article analyses the interaction of Agency, cognition, and values within the moral philosophies of Gandhi and Kant. Both philosophers point out, moral behaviour depends on people having the power to make choices. Gandhi sees the mind as a tool for moral improvement through self-discipline and meditation, while Kant sees reason as a tool for finding and meeting obligations. Even though they come from different cultures, both Gandhi and Kant say important things about how people should make moral decisions and how important it is for means and ends to match moral ideals. Their ethical frameworks allow for a deep discussion on the importance of moral consistency, human agency, and the quest for justice, giving us important insights for modern ethical debates.

Parallel Sessions

Ramesh Dheeravath, University of Allahabad

Title: A critical examination of F.H. Bradley's Critique of Kantian Ethics

In this paper we address the enduring philosophical question of whether we can know the external world and how such knowledge is possible. It examines the interplay between metaphysical and epistemological skepticism, focusing on the critique of traditional empiricism and its reliance on the "Myth of the Given." We place this entire issue in the backdrop of Kantian explanation of empirical knowledge and discuss the post Kantian response to it. In doing so I discuss specifically Davidson and McDowell. Donald Davidson's coherence theory, which rejects the foundationalist approach by denying the scheme-content dualism and the justificatory role of "the Given." Davidson argues that coherence within a belief system ensures truth and correspondence with reality, challenging the empiricist reliance on non-conceptual foundations. John McDowell extends this critique by reviving Kantian insights into empirical knowledge. He emphasizes the inseparability of the faculties of receptivity and spontaneity, asserting that experiential intake already has conceptual content. McDowell rejects the dualistic opposition between scheme and content, proposing a model where the conceptual and experiential work together to justify empirical knowledge. This synthesis addresses skepticism while avoiding the pitfalls of traditional empiricism and coherence theories. I do believe that Kant's framework, as reinterpreted by McDowell, offers the most compelling account of empirical knowledge by integrating external rational constraints and conceptual capacities. This approach provides a balanced resolution to the challenges posed by the "Myth of the Given" and skepticism. However how would Kant respond to our empirical knowledge of our mundane self, ourselves as persons? This is the question I raise and try to at least understand the ways in which this may be answered.

Bijay Kumar Nayak, IIT Bombay

Title: Dignity of Man: A Critical Reflection in Kant's Ethics

This paper attempts to ponder the issues relating to the nobility of man, an ethical (moral) concept, from Kant's perspective and probe into its relevance. The statement- "Man is moral" does not mean that man always does good and avoids bad actions. Human history is full of episodes relating to war and struggle among classes, communities, and countries. Then, why is man special? The responses from various quarters of life give the impression that man is unique as a species and an individual due to something external to it or being human. It seems that whoever is a man is unique. Kant disagrees with this view and says that the ability to act out of goodwill, not general will determines human worth. The norms of evaluating a human action cannot be external. Man is autonomous as she is a self-legislator and other-legislator. Human reason is the source of moral maxims. Prudence, paradigms of good conduct, examples, introspection, inclinations, or feelings based on experience are not the basis of moral action. Living autonomously not isolated is moral. Freedom is a transcendental idea of reason not psychological. It is the ability to act independently of any desires, and inclinations. Freedom implies moral responsibility and self-governance. Self-imposed discipline or self-mastery is sine-qua-non for transcending individuality to universality. The categorical imperative present in the structure of human reason is our ultimate norm. It is nothing but our personality. Hence, what a person decides is her duty and must be her duty. There is no higher moral standard than this imperative by which the rightness and wrongness of an action are decided. This novelty of Kant is a revolution in the field of ethics that there is no authority other than man-herself. The criteria for human dignity are not social rank, wealth, privilege, occupational role, learning, and talents but goodwill.

Samaya Padhi, IIT Bombay

Title: Foreclosure of Moral Exceptions in Kant's Deontology

The absolute rigidness of Kant's deontological system towards any form of moral exceptions has often led to counter-intuitive judgments, such as the infamous injunction of not lying to the murderer at one's door. Sympathetic readers of Kant have thus sought to resolve this problem by arguing that such a foreclosure is, in fact, not necessarily entailed by the Kantian system. Contrary to such claims, this

paper will argue that the foreclosure of the admittance of any form of moral exception is absolutely necessary to the Kantian system since it is a systemic demand. That is, the closure towards any form of moral exceptions is intrinsic, and thus internal, to the very fabric of his moral system. In doing so it will be shown that the source from where the right to lie is claimed to be derived is itself suspect. This paper will thus show that the systemic demand of foreclosure of the admittance of any form of moral exceptions to be upheld is, in fact, cardinal to the Kantian project portrayal of the notion of duty; for even someone so sinister as a murderer is not able to mar the unconditional nature of the deontological demands that ensue from one's duty. The murderer at the door hence represents the strongest test for commitment to the deontological system in the sense that Kant would aver that no 'amount' of evil licenses us to partake of evil even if it is for the purposes of thwarting said evil.

Ayush Srivastava, IIT Bombay

Title: Moral Agency in the Dream State: A Kantian Perspective

There are a lot of arguments and discussions regarding Immanuel Kant's ethical theory in the waking world. However, in this paper, I aim to explore its possible philosophical implications for our dreaming selves. Kant's philosophy provides an excellent explanation of moral agency and responsibility by focusing on the autonomy of rational agents to act in conformity with universalizable moral laws grounded in reason, framed through the categorical imperative. This paper explores the intersection of Kant's account with the phenomena of dreaming, examining how the substantial interruption of reason in ordinary dreaming or the partial restoration of autonomy in lucid dreaming influences moral agency. It claims that in an ordinary dream, almost all rationality goes down, leaving the dreamer with minimal agency, as they are working without rational deliberation and free will- fundamental elements in Kant's conception of moral judgment and assessment. However, the case of lucid dreaming, which refers to when the dreamer becomes conscious that they are dreaming, makes things a little more complicated. In this altered state of consciousness, the dreamers can have at least partial rationality and autonomy, all occurring while dream logic still controls their reasoning.

Some of the critical questions this paper will investigate are:

1. Can actions performed in lucid dreams be morally evaluated according to Kantian moral agency and responsibility standards despite this altered state of consciousness's distorted reasoning and control characteristic?
2. How does the supposed nature of lucid dreams, which are imagined and subjective, make it challenging to apply moral responsibility in relation to the apparent freedom of the dreamer in the context of subconscious determinism?
3. How far can the relevance of Kantian ethics go to explain the phenomenon of lucid dreaming and even the ethical implications thereof?

Finally, I will consider what lucid dreaming adds to the debate on Kantian ethics concerning rational agency and moral responsibility in the non-waking state and whether lucid dreaming can act as a realm for moral experimentation. It tends to blur the agency in waking and dreaming, inviting a reassessment of ethical accountability. These could be pertinent reflections toward a deeper understanding of moral responsibility and an expansion of the Kantian project into the mysterious domain of dreams.

Nupur Rana, University of Edinburgh

Title: Moral Perfection In Kantian Ethics: Objection From Demandingness

In this paper, I aim to show that perfectionism pervades Kant's moral philosophy. I shall argue that perfectionism is an objection under the broader demandingness objection to an ethical theory. I examine Kant's critique of Stoicism from the objection of demandingness and applying similar standards to his own theory, we find that his ethics also demand a degree of moral perfection that is challenging to achieve. Kant's own theory leads to the ideal of a Rational Saint in Susan Wolf's conception of the term. This perfectionism can lead to negative consequences, such as undervaluing extraordinary moral acts and creating burdensome expectations for individuals when it comes to morality. I use Kant's criticism of the Stoics to contextualize the discussion and build my argument about the perfectionism that pervades his ethics. When we use the standards that he uses to judge the Stoic model as too demanding an ethics, we find that his own ethics does not pass the test either. Kant criticizes the ideal of the stoic sage as a strict and unrealistic figure, but his own model of ethics leads to the ideal of a rational saint to use Susan Wolf's term. An ethics that demands its followers to become a moral saint in simply trying to perform moral action, has another fallout

on its flipside. That people who commit great acts of moral goodness are simply seen as performing their duty. This kind of ethics leads to a situation where everyone who leads ordinary lives constantly falls short of the standard of morality, and the extraordinary moral worth of some actions is passed off as duty or even as something not required. For, there are two possible ways a perfectionist theory limits supererogation. One, by containing the heroic acts within the purview of perfect duty, and another way by limiting the scope to go beyond one's duty.

Nabanita Das, IIT Bombay

Title: Rational Will and Causal Order: Kant's Answer to the Autonomy Paradox

The longstanding tension between determinism and autonomy is a key challenge in moral philosophy. Determinism asserts that all human actions are the inevitable result of prior events and external forces, seemingly undermining the possibility of free will. In contrast, the autonomy view holds that individuals possess the capacity to act freely in accordance with rational principles and moral law, independent of empirical constraints. Reconciling these two perspectives raises a fundamental philosophical question: how can rational agents function within a causally determined natural world while maintaining moral autonomy and responsibility? Immanuel Kant addresses this dilemma through his concept of spontaneity, which is a critical framework for demonstrating the coexistence of freedom and determinism. Spontaneity serves as the capacity of rational agents to initiate action based on self-imposed rational principles rather than being mere products of external causation or sensory influence. By acting spontaneously from principles rooted in reason, rational agents navigate the constraints of the natural world while maintaining moral responsibility. Even in a deterministic universe, spontaneity allows individuals to act autonomously, demonstrating that their choices originate from an internal rational will rather than empirical causation. Spontaneity thus functions as the mechanism through which rational beings assert their freedom while embodying moral agency within a causally ordered universe. This study aims to analyze the role of Kant's concept of spontaneity in sustaining the coherence of moral action and its implications for free will, moral responsibility, and the reconciliation of human autonomy with empirical determinism. The analysis demonstrates that Kant's concept resolves a

key philosophical tension and provides a robust foundation for understanding moral agency as rooted in rational commitment, ensuring that freedom and responsibility remain central to human moral life.

Suvodeep Mukherjee, Presidency University

Title: A Naturalistic Re-evaluation through Empirical Reliability and Realistic Lens

Kant's deontological ethics emphasizes moral obligations and duties. Kant argues that moral laws are universal, absolute, and objective. He introduces the categorical imperative, a moral principle that guides decision-making. This principle is based on reason, not emotion or personal preference. It provides a moral framework for evaluating actions. Kant's deontology is scrutinized for its reliance on metaphysical assumptions, including the notion of a transcendental moral law and the concept of free will. Naturalistic critiques challenge the feasibility and universality of Kant's moral principles, highlighting tensions between his normative theory and naturalistic explanations of human behaviour. This analysis aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the strengths and limitations of Kant's deontology, encouraging a more informed discussion of its normative implications. Furthermore, this article explores the naturalistic perspective on ethical deontology, emphasizing wellbeing, human flourishing, and empirical reliability as foundational elements. We argue that normative ethics necessitates a metaphysical claim capable of defining moral notions in terms of natural elements. Our framework provides a robust understanding of moral reality, contributing to ongoing discussions in moral philosophy. By integrating empirical findings and naturalistic perspectives, this article offers a comprehensive re-evaluation of Kant's deontology, promoting a more contextualized understanding of its implications for ethical decision-making. In this paper I shall try to present Immanuel Kant's deontological ethics from a naturalistic perspective, assessing its coherence and validity considering empirical findings from psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology.

Abhinav Kumar, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Kantian Ethics and the Challenge of Ethical Relativism

Ever since Immanuel Kant declared that he could derive moral laws from a priori reason, Kantian ethics became a paradigmatic example of an objective, universal system of ethics – something that is applicable to all human beings in all times and places. But since the last century, if there is one idea that has challenged this objectivist aspiration of ethics, it is relativism. What is interesting is that Kant's own general conception of metaphysics, which, broadly speaking, put the subject at the center of knowledge instead of the object, has been taken as a catalyst for relativistic thinking, even though Kant was far from this idea. To understand moral relativism and its potential challenge to Kantian ethics, I will be taking up a recent, influential defense of it. Carol Rovane, in her book, "The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism" (2013), talks about three different intuitions governing the metaphysical doctrine of relativism – disagreement intuition, relative truth intuition, and Alternatives intuition. This takes relativism beyond 'epistemic disagreement' or 'skepticism' or 'nihilism.' I explore what Kant would say to this metaphysical account of a genuine moral relativist. Keeping this in mind, the goal of the paper is twofold. One is general, and the other is specific. The general goal is to examine how Kant's general metaphysics is related to his conception of ethics and if there is some tension between them. And the specific goal is to see how the Kantian metaphysics of ethics responds to the metaphysics of relativism, especially moral relativism, as propounded by Carole Rovane.

Saurabh Todariya, IIT-Hyderabad

Title: The notion of transcendental in Kant and Husserl: A Critical Analysis

This paper examines the concept of the transcendental in the works of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In Kant's critical philosophy, the transcendental is central as it represents a legitimate mode of inquiry into the ultimate "conditions of possibility." Through transcendental deduction, Kant investigates the conditions that make the appearance of objects possible. This inquiry grounds objectivity in consciousness, where the transcendental ego provides the categories necessary to organize sensory experience. In Critique of Pure Reason, the transcendental inquiry establishes the unity of consciousness, which Kant

describes as a logical presupposition. However, in the *Prolegomena*, Kant introduces the idea of the transcendental unity of feeling as a subjective sense of existence, creating tension with his earlier characterization of the transcendental as a purely logical presupposition. Husserl's phenomenology, particularly in *Ideas*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, interprets the transcendental differently, focusing on the problem of constitution. For Husserl, phenomenological inquiry delves into the essential structures of consciousness that make the constitution of objects possible. In this process, the phenomenological ego experiences itself as the "feeling of mineness," establishing phenomenology as an exploration of first-person consciousness. While Kant's transcendental inquiry halts at the unity of apperception as a formal unity, Husserl argues that the first-person perspective of "mineness" can be further examined through genetic phenomenology. This method investigates the structures that constitute the transcendental ego, including intersubjectivity, time-consciousness, and the lifeworld. By comparing these perspectives, the paper demonstrates that, although Kant and Husserl share a focus on the transcendental, their conceptions diverge significantly due to their differing views on the nature of the transcendental ego.

Vijaya Runchu Choudhary & Ranjan K. Panda, IIT Bombay

Title: Spontaneity, Receptivity, and Consciousness: Revisiting Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception

Immanuel Kant (1987) transcendental account demonstrates the mind's capacity for higher order reflection to emerge from spontaneity, i.e., the active synthesis of representation, and receptivity, i.e., the passive reception of sensory input. R.B. Pippin (1987) argues on spontaneity as mind's self-determining capacity that resists reduction to empirical causality. But, A. Kern (2006) resolves the traditional dualism of receptivity and spontaneity to show how they operate interdependently for performing cognition. T. Land (2006) conceptualizes spontaneity with perceptual synthesis and argues on the reductive model of perceptual unity. Consequently, J. McDowell (1998) connect Kantian spontaneity to Sellars's notion of logical space of reasons, where perceptual and conceptual capacities are inseparable rational obligations, of which the perceptual experiences are actively structured by the mind's engagement with the rational. In these contemporary discussions, the question of how sensory data are unified

into a single experience is not discussed. But Kant's synthesis shows perception and higher-order reasoning are interconnected. The architecture of human mind has both universal cognitive conditions and subjective experience. The mind's activity cannot reduce to causal functions of mental operations but involves a self-determining spontaneity, and the brain actively shapes experiences instead of passively responding to stimuli, because cognition involves a kind of freedom in the self-determining synthesis of representations. This paper reaffirms Kant's epistemology along with contemporary debates around the concept of spontaneity and synthesis to understand Consciousness. Consciousness is the ground of all possibilities for cognition. It is the capacity for unifying the manifold of representations. This epistemic process is what Kant calls as Transcendental Unity of Apperception; it serves as the a priori condition for the coherence of experience and can never itself be derived from experience. Without this, no knowledge, no synthesis, and no reflection would be possible. The transcendental unity of apperception has defended the contemporary discourse on cognition that pertains to higher order consciousness, i.e., a priori understanding of the reflective capacities of the mind.

Prateek Chaubey, IIT Bombay

Title: Against Transparency: Kant's Critique of Introspection and the Case for Inferential Self-Knowledge

Kant notably asserted that rational introspection is the way to self-knowledge, especially moral self-knowledge. For Kant, this involves using reason to uncover the underlying principles that guide our actions and to assess whether those principles are in accordance with the moral law. Kant explicitly denies that we have any direct cognitive access to our true moral disposition. He argues that self-knowledge, especially moral self-knowledge, is inherently opaque; mere introspection cannot tell us whether we are acting from genuine moral motives or hidden self-interest. Kant's methodology is criticised as overlooking the crucial role of social interaction. Kant posits that self-knowledge comes from introspection as well as rational contemplation, but he does not give enough consideration to the idea that it is essentially a social competency. Kant argues for an early inferential approach, where self-knowledge is obtained by observing our conduct over time rather than by direct rational scrutiny. In my paper, I will defend a variant of such an approach: self-knowledge as a skill or ability. By

engaging with Kant's introspective model and inferentialism, I show how self-knowledge functions as a learned competency rather than a given capacity. I then defend this line of reasoning against objections and reinterpret Kant's moral self-knowledge problem through an epistemic and practical lens, offering an account that aligns with inferentialism while emphasizing skill development.

Arnav Madhav, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Quid Juris: Kant and Maimon on the nature and intelligibility of experience

One of the major points of disagreement between Kant and Maimon is in their manner of answering the question of Quid Juris. The question relates to the intelligibility and nature of experience. For Kant, experience becomes intelligible through the simultaneous work of the faculty of sensibility and understanding. In this discursive thesis of Kant, explains that objects are given to us as intuition in the pure and empty form of space and time, and thought through the application of a priori concepts by the faculty of understanding i.e. through the spontaneous activity of judgment. Kant also says that the functions of these two faculties are distinct and cannot be exchanged, and thus there is a real distinction between sensibility on one hand and understanding on the other. Maimon raises contentions against this explanation as for him Kant presumes this bi-partite nature of explanation of experience. For him, experience has to be explained by a single source of cognition alone which for Maimon is the faculty of understanding for transcendental philosophy to remain true to its nature. In his explanation, Maimon proposes space and time to be concepts and forms of diversity that are made intelligible through the faculty of understanding and the form or sensibility of an object is the limited analysis of its concept carried out by understanding. Thus, using his theory of differentials, Maimon diffuses the role of intuition through his analysis of pure mathematical objects, the analysis of which can be carried out completely by the faculty of understanding, while at the same time raising the role of understanding as the unique source of cognition. Moreover, he proposes that our limited understanding (in degrees but not in kind) carries out a limited analysis of the concept of objects to give them in space and time as compared to an unlimited analysis carried out by an infinite intellect that can grasp the absolute nature of the object itself.

Gayatri Giri, IIT Bombay

Title: Agency within the Bounds of Sense: An Analysis of Strawson's Appropriation of the Kantian Transcendental Subject

This paper critically analyses P. F. Strawson's appropriation of Kant's transcendental method in his thesis of Descriptive Metaphysics, and the subsequent conception of subjecthood and agency that can be drawn from such an endeavour. Strawson posits Descriptive Metaphysics as an inquiry into the conceptual schemata that grounds all possible sense-experience. In order to identify such grounds, one must first categorically demarcate the limits of experience. In the Bounds of Sense, Strawson attributes to Kant the achievement of having laid down such limits to experience in a manner that the lower limit anticipates the minimal conceptual structure that grounds all experience, while the upper limit forecloses any possibility of the use of concepts without empirical reference. Thus, the space of sense-experience becomes limited to the space of intelligibility. Peculiarly, Strawson places Kant's thesis of Transcendental Idealism outside of these bounds of sense, labelling it as logically incoherent. The paper argues that through this act of exclusion, Strawson misses the crucial limit of the first Critique, that is, the transcendental subject as the limit demarcating the noumenal and the phenomenal domains. Being uniquely placed, the transcendental subject is reducible neither to the Cartesian pure consciousness nor to the empirical I qua object. However, in rejecting the conditions for this transcendental subject, the ontology of Descriptive Metaphysics can only produce a subject whose "I think" is enabled by the empirical reference of itself as an object. This paper is thus divided into two halves. The first half traces Strawson's novel interpretation of the Kantian limits of sense and to what purpose he utilizes these limits. The second half analyses how these limits come to bear upon the conception of the subject, and how Strawson finds himself bound to a deflated conception of subject and its agency, through his rejection of Transcendental Idealism.

Arundhati Dubey, IIT Bombay

Title: Kant and the Euthanasia of Pure Reason: Remarks on Exigency of Thought

This paper concerns a neglected or, at best, considered an inconsequential part (Strawson 1966) of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Book II of "The Transcendental Dialectic," where Kant discusses the antinomies of pure reason. The antinomies entail that reason runs into inevitable contradiction with itself when it tries to contemplate cosmological ideas like god, freedom, and the world. The typical response to these antinomies is either dogmatism or scepticism. However, Kant suggests that aligning with either of these poles results in "death-blows to sound philosophy" (CPR 379). The paper will suggest that dogmatic and sceptical thinking reduce our social and political reality to forms of determinism without any conception of freedom and subjectivity. The paper will analyze Kant's resolution of the antinomies as a movement beyond these apparently contradictory (but actually contrary) and deterministic positions to suggest a non-deterministic conception of human action and agency. Notably, this non-deterministic position does not result in a "transcendent" position, outside of the world here and now, to sidestep determinism but works through the contrary positions to sustain a transcendent perspective immanent to our thought and world. In other words, working through antinomies without slipping into euthanasia of reason demands sustaining an out-of-jointness, a rupture or a gap immanent to thought itself that otherwise tends to slip into pure transcendent considerations. Accordingly, this paper suggests that euthanasia of reason can result either in dogmatic or sceptical responses or, more productively, present the exigency of thought to maintain a gap between the objective appearance of the world and its subjective representation. The paper maintains that this gap is crucial to sustain philosophy and thought, without which we cannot conceive of the transformation of our socio-political reality and succumb to social and cultural determinism.

Siddhant Khamkar, IIT Bombay

Title: Intelligibility in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science

Characterizing what Kant means by providing "metaphysical foundations" to natural science is difficult, given the breadth of issues he addresses, from

determining the mathematical structure of quantitative concepts such as motion, to arguing for a dynamic theory of matter, against Newton's corpuscular atomism or Leibnizian physical monadism. A central concern in his project is the intelligibility of key concepts in Newtonian science, such as absolute space and attraction. Newton's law of gravitation provides a mathematical description of forces acting at a distance but refrains from explaining their underlying cause, famously avoiding speculation with the declaration, "hypotheses non fingo." While this preserves the empirical rigor of the theory, Leibniz argued that concepts such as attraction amounted to "occult qualities," lacking intelligibility. Kant addresses this tension by reframing Newtonian concepts such as absolute space as regulative ideas rather than possible objects of experience, as they cannot be directly given in empirical intuition. Kant's approach requires that scientific concepts be "grounded" in the categories to qualify as possible objects of experience. This constraint ensures that the concepts are contentful and intimately links their intelligibility to the faculty of understanding. This connection is secured through the schematization of the categories which provides the rules for their application to empirical concepts. However, Kant's framework is not strictly deductive. As Buchdahl (1965) notes, the connection between the categories and specific scientific concepts involves a degree of interpretative flexibility, creating a "looseness of fit" that allows scientific concepts to be integrated into the transcendental framework while accommodating the evolving nature of scientific inquiry. This is exemplified in Kant's explication of matter as "filling space" through attractive and repulsive forces, where these forces are conceived as integral to the very possibility of matter. By doing so, Kant maintains the intelligibility of the concept of "attraction," linking it to the category of quality. However, this approach introduces a tension between the interpretative flexibility of scientific concepts and the constraints of intelligibility within the transcendental framework. This paper aims to characterize Kant's metaphysical foundations as a framework for ensuring the intelligibility of scientific concepts, while examining the constraints and implications of the "looseness of fit" in grounding scientific terms.

Manas Jyoti Deka, University of Allahabad

Title: The Paradox of Telling Lies and Speaking Truth; Experiments with Kantian Moral Laws

Is telling a lie necessarily an evil act, and thus cannot be granted? Is it an evil act because it necessarily involves deceiving someone? What if lying can be permitted? In this paper, I want to reflect on these questions from the Kantian moral point of view. I want to show that, discussions on these question fetch other questions like, what if we must speak the truth in order to act morally? Bringing in instances from the 2009 movie *The Invention of Lying*, directed by Ricky Gervais and Matthew Robinson, I establish that analyses of the structure of lying and speaking truth opens new dimensions of human subjectivity that places Kant immediately with other philosophers like Hegel or Lacan.

Shivanshi Trivedi and Sreetama Misra, IIT Bhubaneswar

Title - The Ethical Void: Freedom, Guilt and Excess from Kant to Post Phenomenology

The paper traces Kantian resolution of the elements of necessity (unfreedom) and freedom in ethics, utilizing Alenka Zupancic's Lacanian reading of Kant, and arrives at an excess in Kant's understanding of the ethical. Consequently though Kant is able to afford transcendental freedom to his system, what remains interesting is the empty place that emerges, as the final solution, to the question of freedom, i.e. site of the choice of disposition (*Gesinnung*). However, given that freedom remains a point of determination as an ethical subject, Kantian freedom seems to emerge only at the end of causal determinations of the ethical, to say that there is no meta-foundation of this freedom and hence of the ethical subject. Rather than being able to resolve this knot, the paper traces this knot as it re-emerges in post-Levinasian phenomenology, in what is referred to as the theological turn and similar to Kant, its alienating presence as the excess in Other. Further, as Zupancic shows, it is in the hubris of guilt that the site of ethical subjectivity emerges in Kant, which finds its resonance in the phenomenological considerations as well. Thus, the paper attempts to open the question that equally reverberates since Kierkegaard, the question of foundation of agency in the face of horror religion.

Nancy Yadav, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Study of Differential Ontology: A Transcendental Empirical Critique of Phenomenology

Deleuze asserts that Phenomenology begins with Kant. His novel innovation lies in treating the apparition of phenomena in terms of the conditions according to which what appears, appears. In Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant credits space and time as conditions for any possible experience. He further notes that every representation is accompanied by an I think ie. unity of apperception. For Kant, the transcendental field is individuated, it contains a transcendental ego and is structured in a way which parallels the empirical world, since the categories are derived from the functions of judgment. Kant's Transcendental Idealism subjects Being to Thought. Speculative Realists like Quentin Millesoux critique this aspect of Kant's as Correlationsim in After Finitude. They believe that the idea that objects are inaccessible apart from how they appear to us is an anthropocentric mistake. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze notes that a true transcendental philosophy investigates the genesis of the conditions of real experience. His Transcendental Empiricism offers a dynamic, creative, and immanent nature of becoming, focusing on a difference oriented synthesis of disjunction instead of the static conditions of possible experience of Kant's Transcendental Idealism. His Differential Ontology of conditions offers a way to get out of the anthropocentric ramifications of Kant's philosophy by formulating simultaneity of being and thought. This paper is a study of the Differential Ontology of Deleuze as a critique of Kant's Transcendental Idealism which inevitably reinstates urdoxa in Phenomenology. Subsequently, it will show how Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism overcomes the static synthesis of possible experience, identity, and harmony with the difference and discord of real experience.

Rutwij Nakhwa, IIT Bombay

Title: Morality, Agency, and Action: From Kant to Hegel (and Back?)

This paper begins by problematizing the typical forgone conclusions about the relation between Kant and Hegel, which present their two idealisms as mutually exclusive: either Hegel's critique of Kant is completely invalid and therefore doesn't affect Kant's philosophy or Hegel's critique totally destroys Kant's critical project which thereby we must leave behind. Aiming for a more productive reading of the Kant-Hegel relation, the paper attempts to pinpoint the real difference between their two idealisms, a difference concerning the distinction between nature and freedom (which they both uphold albeit differently) that undergirds their differing (but perhaps not incompatible) accounts of morality. Then, the paper considers Kant's and Hegel's accounts of agency that follow from their respective accounts of morality. Finally, following from these differences between their accounts of morality and agency, the paper discusses important contemporary consequences—for questions of moral and ethical responsibility—of Kant's and Hegel's theories of action, action as private and ontologically closed (for Kant) and public and ontologically open (for Hegel). The paper's larger concern is about the relevance of Kant's and Hegel's conceptions of morality, agency, and action in a world that has long shattered the Enlightenment optimism shared by both philosophers about the progressive development of human morality. Addressing this concern a bit speculatively, on the background of Anglo-American Kantian readings of Hegel (e.g. by Pippin, Pinkard, Brandom), the paper asks if a Hegelian reading of Kant is possible and relevant for us today.

Naveen Kumar, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Reconsidering Ability: A Kantian-Phenomenological Approach to the Ethics of Disability

This paper explores the ethics of disability through a Kantian-phenomenological framework, challenging traditional notions of ability and disability. Drawing on Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy and the phenomenological insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this paper argues that the experience of disability reveals the complex, embodied, and intersubjective nature of human existence. Through a critical analysis of Kant's concept of dignity and Merleau-Ponty's notion of

embodied intentionality, this paper examines how societal expectations and norms around ability and disability can both enable and constrain human flourishing. It challenges Kant's notion of dignity as a rational, disembodied capacity, and instead argues for a more nuanced understanding of dignity as an embodied, relational phenomenon. This paper also explores the implications of a phenomenological understanding of the body for our understanding of disability. By emphasizing the body's capacity for adaptation, creativity, and resilience, this paper argues that disability can be seen as a natural part of human existence, rather than a deviation from a normative standard. Ultimately, this paper aims to develop a more inclusive and nuanced understanding of human existence, one that recognizes the complex intersections between embodiment, ability, and dignity. By integrating Kantian and phenomenological insights, this paper seeks to contribute to ongoing debates in fields such as disability studies, bioethics, and moral philosophy.

J Manimekhla, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Embodied Freedom: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Gender through a Phenomenological-Kantian Lens

This paper explores the complex relationships between human dignity, autonomy, and gender through a Phenomenological-Kantian framework. Drawing on the phenomenological insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, this paper argues that human dignity and autonomy are inextricably linked to embodied experience and the capacity for self-consciousness. It challenges traditional notions of human dignity and autonomy, which have often been based on masculine norms and values. Through a feminist lens, this paper argues that human dignity and autonomy are deeply intertwined with gender and embodiment. The paper explores how societal expectations and norms around gender and embodiment can both enable and constrain human dignity and autonomy. It examines how gender-based violence, discrimination, and marginalization can undermine human dignity and autonomy, and how feminist theories and practices can help to reclaim and reassert them. Through a critical analysis of Kant's concept of autonomy and Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodied intentionality, this paper examines how societal expectations and norms around gender and embodiment can both enable and constrain human dignity and autonomy. It challenges traditional Kantian notions of autonomy as a

disembodied, rational capacity, and instead argues for a more nuanced understanding of autonomy as an embodied, intersubjective phenomenon. Ultimately, this paper aims to develop a more comprehensive and inclusive understanding of human dignity and autonomy, one that recognizes the complex intersections between embodiment, self-consciousness, and human flourishing. By integrating phenomenological and Kantian insights, this paper seeks to contribute to ongoing debates in fields such as moral philosophy, feminist theory, and phenomenology. It will try to develop a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of human dignity and autonomy, one that recognizes the complex intersections between gender, embodiment, and human flourishing. By doing so, it seeks to contribute to ongoing debates in fields such as human rights, feminist philosophy, and bioethics.

Simran, Sir Parshurambhau College, Pune

Title: Kantian Phenomenology, Subjectivity and Embodiment

Kantian Phenomenology, Subjectivity and Embodiment When we think of phenomenology and Kant, it's transcendental phenomenology to which we refer, the phenomenology of epistemology and subjectivity. Yet the classical phenomenology of embodiment and corporeality doesn't invoke Kantian contributions and seems uniquely detached from Kantian philosophy. Neo-Kantian "phenomenologists" such as Rockmore (2011) seem to require completely redefining phenomenology in order to treat Kant and Hegel as the real phenomenologists. The questions I want to answer in my paper is, how can we call on Kant in our classical and contemporary phenomenological investigations of embodiment and corporeality? Are the two incompatible? How can we compare and contrast the notions of the transcendental self and the embodied self? In the field of neurophenomenology, Khachouf et al (2013) have argued that given a definition of transcendality as that which concerns the a priori formal structures of the subject's mind as a precondition for knowledge, this transcendental can be conceived as rooted in biology. Similarly Robertson (2020) argues that Kantian cognition occurs through embodied activity in the material world, and the body has an active role in determining experience. Yet Kant's account severs the connection between the empirical and transcendental self, allowing potentially for two conflicting accounts of the self (Durt, 2020). Yet classical and contemporary phenomenology don't view the embodied body as a

mere body in the world, but as subjectivity. The latter especially draws light to the body in its situatedness in the world, for example, feminist phenomenology talks about female embodiment in a patriarchal situation. In the Kantian paradigm, “I am conscious” has a two-fold I—as subject and as object, an example that immediately brings me to mind the touching hands of Merleau-Ponty. In my paper I will attempt to trace the development of phenomenology back to its epistemological roots in Kant in an attempt to conceptualize contemporary questions of the body, embodied realities and embodiment.

Payel Basak & Sreetama Misra, IIT Bhubaneswar

Title: Moral Struggle and Agency: Reassessing Kantian Ethics in the Context of Transhuman Moral Beings

“Are transhumans moral agents?” is a basic question in genetic engineering ethics that is addressed in this study from a Kantian ethical standpoint. One crucial element that has been identified as important for moral agents is “moral struggle”. Can transhumans be deemed moral agents, and how does Kantian ethics address this element of moral struggle among transhumans. The paper defends this position from two angles. First, to explore the conflicts between “perfect duties” and “imperfect duties” based on McCarty’s reading of Kant (Baxley, 2010; McCarty, 1991; Wood, 2008), which leads to the “moral struggle” in human beings, an essential condition of human moral agency. Secondly, to explore various experiences which originate out of “moral struggle” such as moral distress (Frank, 2020; Lachman, 2016; Robinson et al., 2014), moral overload (Frank, 2020; Van Den Hoven et al., 2012), moral residue (Lachman, 2016; Frank, 2020) and moral disgust (Hauskeller, 2007) - all leading together to “moral regret” (McCarty, 1991). These experiences are crucial for human moral development, but they are not necessarily required for the development of agency in a morally augmented transhuman. Finally, the paper will analytically reflect on the idea that morally augmented transhumans would not experience struggle, conflict and/or other emotions for two reasons. Because they are pre-programmed beings, which will make them follow the moral commands inherently, much like Kant’s notion of holy will; and, also due to the fact that in Kant, there is no place for disgust, distress, regret and such emotions (McCarty, 1991). According to this interpretation, transhumans will naturally uphold morality and have no room for moral conflict, which will relieve them of their emotional weight and make them

close to pure moral beings. The ramifications of this interpretation of Kantian ethics lead to a more thorough examination of whether transhumans are moral agents, with a conceptual approach being used to reconsider the above mentioned standards for moral agency in the context of human augmentation.

Rahul Maurya, Banaras Hindu University

Title: Reason, Truth and Rights: A Critical Reading of Kant and Rorty

Reason, Truth and Freedom are intertwined with each other and play the bedrock of Platonic and Kantian Enlightenment? For the Enlightenment, the Reason has been capable of unraveling the deeper human self/nature which in turn frees us, the human beings from their embeddedness to the concrete and contingent situations. The 18th century enlightenment's project was to ensure human beings' confidence in themselves concerning matters of public importance. Its aim was to place the human being's confidence in reason in order to think for themselves and free them from the self-incurred immaturity. The emphasis of the enlightenment's project was to secure Reason a central place which is endowed with a capacity to fathom a universal human nature and thus guaranteeing freedom to human beings. The attempt will be made to understand whether the Kantian Enlightenment has been able to achieve its proclaimed goal or it has failed. Many modern philosophers further see the advent of Human Rights from the Kantian Enlightenment project as if human rights are just a part of the extended culture of the enlightenment. Here I would like to bring in Richard Rorty who sees that the Enlightenment project has failed to achieve what it has prophesied. It could not overcome the Platonic universal forms, something which have been transcendental in nature. For Rorty the Enlightenment could not break away from the shadow of religion which it had struggled against. Finally the paper will attempt to examine whether the enlightenment's goal can be achieved through invoking sentimentality rather than by knowing deeper human nature and universal moral principles. For him human rights can best be viewed as nothing but the summarization from the given cultures and not from the given fixed human nature.

Aditi, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Global Injustice and Shared Responsibility: Exploring the Interplay between Iris Marion Young and Immanuel Kant

The liberal tradition of political philosophy construes obligations of justice only between those living under a common constitution within a single political community. Iris Marion Young challenges this view by arguing that obligations of justice take place between individuals not by a single community but in virtue of the social processes that connect them. This is because certain injustices come to people as structural social injustices and connect people across the globe transcending the political boundaries. In response, Young develops a “social connection of model of responsibility” which suggests that every individual who have contributed to these injustices bear responsibility to remedy those injustices. And since structural injustice is the effect of the actions of many individuals, either intentional or unintentional, it requires a global perspective. However, Young’s social connection model suffers from certain limitations as the participation of members in this model of responsibility is not mandatory. This paper will hence draw on Immanuel Kant’s concept of perfect positive duties to strengthen the case for the social connection model. In the case of perfect positive duties, Kant emphasises a broader and more inclusive understanding of moral responsibility. Kant argues that rather than limiting duties to those we are personally or immediately responsible for harming, we have moral duty to correct the imbalance that the social system has create because of our involvement in broader social systems. This paper hence strengthens the shared responsibility for global injustices by taking integrating Young’s social connection model with Kant’s notion of positive perfect duties. Such an approach will highlight how remedial actions for the injustices are binding moral obligations rather than being voluntary. The paper hence argues for a structural account of responsibility to remedy injustices in a global context.

Arif Guljar, IIT Bombay

Title: Reframing Poverty Alleviation: Engaging Kantian Ethics and Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model

Poverty, as a consequence of structural injustice, diminishes individual autonomy, dignity, and agency. Therefore, a collective moral response is required to address

the structural causes of poverty. Violetta Igneski, in *A Kantian Moral Response to Poverty* (2023), argues for extending Kantian ethics beyond individual duties to include collective obligations. Drawing on Kant's principle of treating individuals as ends in themselves, Igneski asserts that collective moral duties arise when unstructured groups, such as humanity, possess the mediated capacity to address systemic issues like poverty. She emphasizes that individuals bear duties to form and empower collective agents capable of structural change, as failing to do so constitutes moral indifference to the needs of others (Igneski, 2023, pp. 257–259). Iris Marion Young's (2011) "social connection model" as collective responsibility complements Igneski's framework by emphasizing that responsibility for structural injustices arises not from individuals directly causing harm, but from their participation in and contributions to broader interconnected social systems that perpetuate these injustices such as poverty. Unlike the blame-oriented liability model, Young's approach would focus on forward-looking responsibility, urging individuals and collectives to engage in structural reforms to address structural causes of poverty. She argues that structural injustices arise because of the actions of many individuals who contribute to processes that produce unjust outcomes (Young, 2011, p. 52). By integrating Igneski's Kantian perspective with Young's social connection model, this paper offers a robust theoretical framework for addressing global poverty. While Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" provides a normative vision of humanity as a collective working to uphold justice and autonomy (Igneski, 2023, p. 261), Young's emphasis on collective action and structural reform offers practical guidance for realizing this vision. Both Kant's and Young's approaches emphasize the significance of collective moral obligations to address poverty and empower marginalized communities.

Henry Vumjou, Krea University

Title: Kant's External Freedom and the Principle of Publicity In Perpetual Peace

Kant states that the civil constitution of every state shall be republican. The republican constitution is a constitution established according to the principles of freedom of members in a society, dependence on common legislation and according to the law of equality. By "republican", Kant means a political society that, from a legal standpoint, successfully reconciles moral autonomy, individualism, and social order (Doyle 2006, 205). Kant proposes the idea of a

republican civil constitution because individual freedom is most secure in such a democratic constitution. This implies a transition from private right (state of nature) to the rightful condition (state). However, even within the realm of international rights, Kant identifies the persistence of another state of nature as a threat to the stability of republican democracy within a state. The question then is: what sustains external individual freedom? This paper argues that adherence to the principle of publicity sustains external individual freedom. Kant emphasises the principle of publicity (of maxim) as the criterion for determining the principle of right (PP 8:381). The paper explicates the principle of publicity, which is underexplored within the literature on political philosophy. Any claim capable of publicity provides an easily applicable criterion found a priori in reason. The principle of publicity, according to Kant, entails openness and transparency in the formulation of maxims or subjective principles for external action. The paper asserts that adherence to the principle of publicity is a distinctive feature of the Kantian conception of individual external freedom, which distinguishes it from other conceptions of external freedom.

Akash Singh & Kriti Dwivedi, IIT Madras

Title: Motivations and Foundations: Hume and Kant on Morality – A Study of Political Finance in India

This paper develops a heuristic distinction between normative foundations and individual motivations by drawing on the works of Immanuel Kant and David Hume. Hume declared reason to be the “slave of passions”. He emphasized individual motivations as the basis of morality. In contrast, Kant’s moral philosophy rests on categorical imperatives, which he describes as objective, rationally necessary, and unconditional principles. These imperatives demand adherence regardless of individual desires or motivations. Kant argues that morality must be rooted in rational foundations, independent of individual inclinations. This distinction holds significance for contemporary society. It suggests that a law cannot be sustained if it directly contradicts the motivations of individuals. We apply this framework to analyze political finance in India. Through a qualitative analysis of Supreme Court judgments, legislation, and committee reports, we identify two normative foundations of political finance: transparency and a level playing field. However, drawing on existing literature, we demonstrate that the motivations of individuals participating in electoral

politics stand in stark opposition to these foundations. Politicians seek to maintain opacity and disrupt the level playing field whenever possible. This analysis leads to two key observations. First, governments, under the guise of upholding normative foundations, often prioritize the motivations of their political parties. Examples include the Electoral Bond Scheme and Indira Gandhi's ban on corporate funding of elections. Second, the persistent conflict between motivations and foundations creates an impasse. Politicians routinely circumvent laws designed to regulate political finance, undermining the very principles these laws aim to uphold.

Satyabrata Biswas, IIT Madras

Title: Capitalism, Development and Justice: Reflections from Kant and Contemporary Moral Thinkers

At the end of the tumultuous twentieth century, history saw the upper hand of global capitalism over socialism. In the twenty-first century, the challenge is morally coping with capitalism and globalisation. Suppose we see development as a construct through the lenses of capitalism and globalisation. In that case, the main moral hurdle is ascertaining an equal and sustainable share of development for every person possible. Identity also plays an important role here. In (the world as) a global village, we need to ensure that each person gets the benefits of development without being uprooted from his/her linguistic, ethnic and cultural background. If we think of sustainable economic development for the equal benefit of all, we also need to think of global distributive justice. Any economic development programme must be adopted, if and only if the beneficiaries are not a handful but the maximum possible. Keeping this problem in the background, this essay will focus on constructing a critical engagement between the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and contemporary thinkers, like Marx, Nussbaum, Rawls, Sen, and Weber. Kant's formulation of deontology, categorical imperative and moral autonomy can play a key role in understanding this problem. If economic and livelihood development is morally good for us then it has to be good universally. That means the outcome of economic development should be equally distributed among every person possible. Also if we consider economic and social development as a part of basic human rights, then choice becomes highly important. Whether the policymakers have autonomous agencies to outline an economic development plan, which is distributively justified, makes the

problem more complex. This paper will show how we can use some crucial notions of Kantian ethics and contemporary moral thinkers to understand the tension between capital-based economic development, global justice and human rights.

Iyarana Sarkar & Rajakishore Nath, IIT Bombay

Title: Understanding AI Ethics in the lens of Kantian Deontology

Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues to advance in various fields, including ethical questions about its use, responsibility, and potential consequences for individuals, societies, and humanity. In this paper, we will explore the philosophical problems of Kantian deontology in relation to AI ethics, mainly focusing on the key principles of duty and autonomy. This paper, too, investigates the concept of AI-based moral agency and responsibility as strong AI thinkers grapple with the idea of AI as a moral agent. Traditionally, moral agency has been attributed to sentient beings capable of conscious deliberation on ethical decision-making. However, there is an explanatory gap concerning moral responsibility between machines and moral agents. These gaps lie at the heart of contemporary discourse on AI ethics and need more philosophical deliberation. Furthermore, as AI systems become more autonomous, concerns about accountability, transparency, and fairness raise many ethical questions. How do AI-driven decisions align with ethical principles and societal values? Can we mitigate the risks of algorithmic biases and unintended consequences? Addressing these philosophical questions would require interdisciplinary insights into studying human society, the digital interface, and ethical foresight. In this context, Kant's philosophy, focusing on duties that transcend empirical contingencies, invites us to ask whether AI—as a non-rational entity—can be meaningfully situated within a moral framework of human moral agency. This way, we will discuss deeper engagement with Kantian philosophy and critically interrogate the constitutive AI moral agency within which AI operates technologies.

Abhijit Tarafdar, Presidency University

Title: Examining Kant's contribution to medical ethics: A critical reflection

This paper will explore the contributions and limitations of Kantian moral theory within contemporary field of medical ethics. I will not deal with Immanuel Kant's specific remarks about the ethical issues in medical practice rather this paper would try to explore central paradigm of argument regarding the philosophy of healthcare with respect to their importance in contemporary medical ethics. As one of the foundational moral theories, besides virtue ethics and utilitarianism, Kantian approach of deontology has a special significance in the study of ethics. Many ethical issues in medical practice are encountered with Kantian ethical paradigm. Critics, however, argue that Kant's moral theory is quite more dependent on autonomy, rationalism and universal maxims and shows less reliance on the emotional side of the moral agent and insufficiently addresses emotional and relational dynamics, asymmetrical relationships between physician and patient or between autonomous and rational agents and contextual nuances in healthcare system. Kantian ethics has been charged with being rigorous and eliminating those who do not truly possess these qualities, in addition to having an individualist and rationalist emphasis on autonomy. This paper will explicate the contribution of Kantian paradigm of moral theory to encounter modern ethical dilemmas in medical practice, including patient autonomy, organ donation, and end-of-life care, offering insights into its strengths and shortcomings. Finally, I will analyze and show that despite critiques of exclusiveness, individualism and rigorous ethical method, Kantian moral theory provides a robust, consistent and universal framework essential for navigating the challenges of contemporary healthcare and how it can bridge the gap between abstract principles and practical application to contribute meaningfully to the evolving field of medical ethics.

Akanksha Prajapati & Rajakishore Nath, IIT Bombay

Title: Exploring Ecological Agency in Kant's Philosophy

Immanuel Kant's philosophy is often critiqued as an anthropocentric underpinning in ecological problems, given its emphasis on human rational autonomy as the foundation for moral agency and responsibility. However, Kant does not explicitly advocate a non-anthropocentric view as 'ecological agency'.

However, some aspects of his philosophy can be reinterpreted or extended to establish a non-anthropocentric foundation for ecological agency. This paper explores whether Kant's moral philosophy can be a foundation for 'ecological agency.' The deep ecology philosopher Arne Naess gives the concept of the ecological self which refers to the deep sense of identity that arises when individuals recognize themselves as interconnected with the natural world. It transcends anthropocentric boundaries to embrace a broader sense of being that includes nature as an integral part of one's self. Aligning with this internal aspect, we propose an external and practical aspect, 'ecological agency,' which refers to the capacity to act in ways that acknowledge and support broader ecological well-being. This raises the potential or inquiry of whether Kantian ethics can accommodate an ecological agency that considers nature's intrinsic value and our duties towards the non-human world. This synthesis challenges the conventional anthropocentric reading of Kant and opens pathways for inquiring ecological agency within a Kantian ethical framework. However, treating nature as an interconnected system that sustains rational agent's humanly duty to preserve ecological integrity is a moral imperative. Kant's principle of universalizability demands that we act according to maxims that can be applied universally. Ecological destruction undermines the sustainability of life for all rational beings by violating this principle. For example, the maxim of 'exploiting nature without restraint' leads to environmental collapse, making it irrational and self-contradictory. Thus, ecological responsibility becomes a rational moral obligation within Kant's framework. In *Critique of Judgment*, Kant introduces the idea of purposiveness in nature. Although he sees nature as a system that appears purposeful for human understanding, his teleological view suggests a certain self-organizing principle within nature, like- Nature operates as an interconnected whole with inherent order and beauty. This interconnected purposiveness allows us to recognize that nature is not simply a means for human use but has value in itself as a harmonious, organized system. By respecting the purposiveness of nature, humans can act as ecological agents who preserve and participate in its intrinsic order rather than exploiting it. The paper concludes by proposing a reinterpretation of Kantian autonomy and freedom that can emphasize humanity's rational duty to preserve and care for ecological systems as essential to a sustainable moral order.

Aishwarya Dingre & Sayli Mukund Deshmukh, Banaras Hindu University

Title: Free Will and Human Actions Today: Contrasting Kantian Ethics in Modern Aspect

What does it mean to act freely in a world governed by causality? Is human autonomy a relic of metaphysical idealism, or does it hold enduring significance in an age dominated by neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and global interconnectivity? These questions challenge us to reconsider the essence of moral agency in the face of deterministic frameworks that increasingly blur the lines between free will and mechanistic necessity. If human actions are shaped by unconscious processes, programmable algorithms, and external forces, can we still claim to act autonomously? Immanuel Kant's writing over two centuries ago, that humans exist simultaneously as empirical beings bound by causality and rational agents capable of autonomous action. We hold people responsible for things, even though their decisions appear to us to be deterministic. We do not hold them responsible for the circumstances that lead to their decision, but we hold them responsible for having made this decision. But does Kant's framework resonate with the ethical and technological complexities of the 21st century? This paper argues that Kantian autonomy remains relevant amidst deterministic paradigms, that aligns his moral vision with contemporary demands. By positing the empirical self as subject to causality and the rational self as transcendent, Kant provides a scaffold for reconciling free will with empirical findings, such as neuroscience's focus on unconscious decision-making processes. Kantian ethics emphasizing universality and the inherent dignity of rational beings—offers a robust framework for navigating the ethical complexities of AI and autonomous systems. The study proposes guidelines for ethical AI design and explores how Kant's principles can inform moral decision-making algorithms. Kantian rationality synthesizes with contemporary studies on empathy and emotional intelligence. This paper engages in these pressing questions to reflect on the enduring vitality of Kant's ideas. By bridging the timeless insights of his philosophy with contemporary advancements, it explores whether Kantian autonomy can illuminate the intricate balance between freedom and necessity in our rapidly evolving world where the boundaries of human agency are being fundamentally redefined.

Harshita Tripathi, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Title: Kantian Autonomy in the Age of Climate Crisis: Reconciling Individual Agency and Collective Moral Responsibility

Problem of global climate change presents pressing moral and philosophical challenges of our time. It is a paradigmatic case of collectively-caused systemic harm. The cumulative actions of countless individuals and collectives result in widespread environmental degradation, yet no single moral agent can be said to bear sole responsibility for this harm. In the light of escalating climate crises, this paper explores how Kant's concept of autonomy can provide an ethical framework for bridging the apparent divide between individual agency and collective responsibility. Kantian autonomy emphasizes the universalizable principles and the intrinsic dignity of all rational creatures, and it offers a basis for moral agency that extends beyond the self. This paper argues that Kant's moral philosophy compels individuals to act as part of a larger moral community, holding themselves accountable not only for personal actions but also for influencing collective outcomes. The categorical imperative, particularly its universal law formulation, reveals the moral incoherence of inaction and thus is re-examined in light of environmental ethics, extending its scope to include obligations toward preserving ecological systems as essential to human dignity and agency, as autonomy is contingent upon a livable world. The paper also addresses the tension between freedom and obligation in climate action, proposing that Kant's emphasis on rational will and duty can serve as a counter-narrative to prevailing individualistic or purely economic approaches to climate responsibility. It also highlights the need for global cooperation, grounded in Kant's cosmopolitan ideal of a universal moral community that respects both individual autonomy and the imperatives of collective justice to effectively address systemic environmental harm. The paper attempts to establish that Kantian autonomy does not isolate the moral agent but situates her within a nexus of obligations to others, thereby demanding an ethical reimagining of individual and collective responsibility in the anthropocene.

Nidhi Maurya & Sayantika Adhikary, Banaras Hindu University

Title: Rethinking anthropocentrism: Extending Kant's Moral Imperative to Climate Change

Climate change is one of the most concerning issues of the modern era, arising from an anthropocentric worldview's dominance. This perspective points out that humans are the central and most significant entities, assigning instrumental value to all other living beings and the natural world. This kind of mindset reduces nature to a mere means for fulfilling human purposes which encourage an exploitative relationship with the environment. This unfair framework has pushed to severe environmental crises, such as global warming, biodiversity loss, and other ecological catastrophes. This paper critically examines the ethical foundations of the anthropocentric perspective and its role in environmental degradation. To challenge this view, the paper explores Immanuel Kant's Moral Imperative, a principle that demands individuals act according to absolute, unconditional moral laws that respect others as ends rather than means. While Kant primarily focused on human interactions, this work seeks to extend his ethical framework to encompass non-human entities and the natural world. By advocating for a reinterpretation of Kantian ethics to recognize the intrinsic value and autonomy of all living beings, the paper proposes an alternative moral foundation. This expanded ethical approach encourages humanity to move beyond anthropocentrism, fostering a more inclusive and respectful relationship with the environment. In doing so, it offers a philosophical pathway toward mitigating the root causes of climate change and promoting ecological sustainability.

Kevezai Turang, Nagaland University

Title: Universality and Particularity: A Comparative Analysis of Kantian Ethics and Naga Tribal Values

Immanuel Kant's concept of values is grounded in the universality of moral law, autonomy, and the inherent worth of rational agents. Through the categorical imperative, Kant posits that moral actions must conform to principles that can be universally willed, emphasizing duty over consequence. Human dignity, as

intrinsic to rational beings, is central to his deontological ethics, where values are objective and grounded in reason, transcending cultural and subjective contingencies. In contrast, the tribal values of Nagaland are embedded in communal life, oral traditions, and an intrinsic connection to nature. These values prioritize relational harmony, collective well-being, and respect for elders, transmitted through lived practices rather than abstract principles. Morality here is contextual and deeply rooted in cultural specificity, emphasizing virtues like humility, honesty, and reciprocity within a relational framework. Kant's universalism and the particularism of Naga tribal values diverge significantly. Kantian ethics focuses on the autonomy of individuals as moral agents bound by universal principles, whereas Naga tribal values derive their meaning from communal contexts and traditions. However, both converge in their recognition of intrinsic worth and the moral imperative to respect others. Kant's principle of universal respect parallels the Naga ethos of relational dignity, albeit through differing ontological and epistemological lenses. This juxtaposition highlights the tension between universalist ethics and culturally situated values. Kant's rationalist framework aspires to transcend cultural particularities, whereas Naga tribal ethics is grounded in the lived experiences of a specific community. Yet, their shared commitment to moral integrity emphasizes the potential for dialogue between universal principles and cultural particularity, enriching cross-cultural philosophical discourse.

Upama Sarkar, Presidency University

Title: A Comparative Study Between Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer: The Influence of Transcendental Idealism on Will and Representation

This article presents a comparative analysis of the philosophical systems of Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, two towering figures in the history of German Idealism. Kant's philosophy, particularly his theory of transcendental idealism, holds that the structure of human experience is shaped by the mind's inherent faculties. According to Kant, while we can never know things as they are in themselves (noumena), we apprehend them as they appear to us, filtered through our sensory and cognitive faculties (phenomena). This article explores how Schopenhauer's philosophy, particularly his concept of the 'will,' evolves from Kant's groundwork yet diverges in significant ways. Schopenhauer, a self-professed Kantian, adopts the Kantian framework but transforms it by introducing

the idea that the thing-in-itself is not merely unknowable but is fundamentally the ‘will,’ a blind, irrational force that underlies all phenomena. Schopenhauer’s focus on the will as the ultimate reality contrasts with Kant’s emphasis on the unknowable noumenon, offering a unique synthesis of metaphysical and epistemological insights. The article examines the implications of Schopenhauer’s assertion that the will is the essence of all beings, expanding upon Kant’s initial understanding of human perception and cognition, yet ultimately rejecting Kant’s more optimistic notion of human autonomy and reason. The study also addresses Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s reliance on reason and morality, arguing that the will is not just a metaphysical concept but also a force with profound ethical implications. This comparison deepens our understanding of how both philosophers grapple with the limitations of human knowledge and the nature of reality, showing how Schopenhauer provides a critical development of Kantian thought, while also suggesting a more tragic vision of the human condition.

Maharnav Singhal, IIT Hyderabad

Title: Kant and the Question of Animal: A Jain Perspective

Animals have received an ambiguous status in Kant’s moral philosophy. The rational ability which Kant calls the practical reason enables humans to rise above their particularities and take the universal point of view as a member of the ‘Kingdom of Ends’. On one hand, this rationality of humans is not shared by animals and thus Kant argues that there cannot be moral duties towards animals. On the other hand, Kant does not allow cruelty towards animals as it may result in the depravity of human nature, making him completely insensitive and unfit for moral deliberation. Therefore, Kant in his ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ calls for indirect duties towards animals. Korsgaard, in her work ‘Fellow Creatures’, strengthens this understanding that our emotional dispositions and moral sentiments can influence and reflect our moral character, thereby leading to a need for indirect obligations towards animals. However, the notion of ‘indirect duties’ awards animals an ambivalent status and leads to the formation of an animal-human binary, where humans are defined in contrast with animals. Jainism on the other hand, approaches the question of animals through the notion of ‘senses’. The sense organs define the varied capacity to experience the world by the organisms. The elemental beings have only one sense, the sense of touch, and

other beings have two, three and four senses. Under this framework, humans and animals both share all five senses, i.e., sense of touch, taste, smell, sight, and sound. Hence, the embodied existence of humans and animals on Earth makes them both equally vulnerable to suffering, as a result of which both humans and animals share the predicament of suffering. Jainism, however, brings out an ontological difference between humans and animals despite their status as ‘fellow sufferers’, based on humans’ capacity to attain liberation from the cycle of birth and death. However, Jainist doctrine and stories about rebirth of humans into animals and vice-versa hints the exists of an ever-alive possibility of becoming animals in the context of samsara. Therefore, current birth as animal or human is not an absolute thing in Jainism. This in-between status of earthly existence of humans in Jainism puts humans in a unique and ethical relationship with the animals.

Kalparnab Gupta, IIT Bombay

Title: The Kantian Interpretation of Nāgārjuna: A Critique

Kant received much attention in Indian philosophy circles. The idealistic philosophers in this subcontinent made use of the Kantian framework to investigate classical Indian philosophy. In Nāgārjunian scholarship, Murti followed the same route. Murti’s magnum opus on Madhyamaka Buddhism, “The Central Philosophy of Buddhism”, was heavily influenced by Kant. In this book, he posited *śūnyata* as a thing devoid of all predicates, transcendent to speech and thought and outside the limit of discursive thought. *Śūnyatā* is thus made much akin to Kantian noumena. Murti, influenced by Sankara’s Advait, was an ontological monist and an absolutist. *Śūnyatā*, for him, is the universal impersonal reality of the world. The Kantian lens is used as a provisional means only to attain this objective. The paper critiques this Kantian-Advaitic framework of Nagarjuna’s interpretation. A careful analysis of Nāgārjuna’s principal text i.e. *MMK* reveals that *Śūnyatā* can neither be treated as a positive doctrine nor a philosophical position asserting the existence of any positive entity. It simply shows the relational nature of phenomena. Emptiness is neither a positive phenomena nor an object of knowledge. As a radical anti-essentialist, Nāgārjuna does not have any ontological commitment. The negative dialectics is not aimed at proving any transcendental Absolute but it highlights interdependence and relative nature of the things. Nāgārjuna is a true successor of the Buddha who

warns us against getting into the deep waters of metaphysical speculation. The sharp blades of his prāsanga arguments cuts all outgrowths of speculative metaphysics.

Darshna Kumar, IIT Gandhinagar

Title: Kant's aesthetic realm and the emergence of aesthetic perception in Merleau-Ponty

This paper dwells on the intersection between Kant's aesthetic realm and Merleau-Ponty's utilization of the symbol "hollow," focusing on how meaning is generated. It begins by examining the concept of apriori within transcendental philosophy. It traces Kant's transcendental idealism, which posits the apriori as a set of immutable categories necessary for synthesizing experience. Kant's framework focuses on the categories of form and matter, sensibility and understanding, and emphasizes the necessity of temporal synthesis for unifying experience, as well as the certainty of knowledge. To this, I contrast and employ Merleau-Ponty's work, specifically his lecture notes on Nature. I demonstrate the perceptual act taking the place of aesthetic judgment that develops as a textual trace of the hollow. Here, I read the hollow as a symbol for the invisibility of visibility in Merleau-Ponty's reversibility thesis. The argument is that the principle of identification found in Kant, upon deeper investigation, appears to be without a ground. The a priori is fixed and certain. One can trace a line of thought in transcendental philosophy, starting with Kant, where identification is the unity of antecedents; moving on to Husserl, where specificities began to be pinned down; and finally to Merleau-Ponty, where phenomena become dynamic and sensorially motivated. A hollow is a thick invisibility of a phenomenon that is saturated with sensorialities. When contacted, the hollow works like a magnet, deflecting an attempt to penetrate it and giving rise to multiple perceptions depending on the situatedness of the contact.

Amit Kumar Chourasia, University of Hyderabad

Title: Is Kant's notion of Enlightenment really 'enlightening' for an individual?

The objective of this paper is to analyse whether Kantian notion of Enlightenment is really 'enlightening' for an individual subject who is subjugated throughout history with reference to Michel Foucault's notion of Enlightenment. According to Kant, "Enlightenment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity" (Kant, 1996: 58). It means if an individual has the courage to use one's reason without the guidance of any text, a priest or a doctor or without the guidance of any authority, then that individual is considered to have achieved the Enlightenment (maturity status). Moreover, the use of reason must be publicly granted (freedom to use reason publicly on all matters); however it must be privately submissive to the authority: "Argue, as much as you want and whatever you want, only obey!" (Kant, 1996: 63). In this connection, Foucault argues that Kant has divided the use of reason into two parts: where on the one hand, the use of reason must be publicly free; but on the other hand, it must be privately submissive to the authority. In this way, it is completely opposite of what is generally considered the "freedom of conscience" (Foucault, 1997: 307). Hence it seems that Kant's suggestion to freely use one's reason in public discourse is just an intellectual activity rather than having any practical implications to bring any real change by voicing against the oppressive practices. In this regard, we will analyse to what extent Kant's notion of Enlightenment is useful to understand and come over one's subjugations and whether Foucault renders a more sophisticated account of Enlightenment. Thereby we will come to know whether Kant's notion of Enlightenment is really 'enlightening' or it is just a facade.

Barada Laxmi Panda, Presidency University

Title: Application of Kantian Deontology in Everyday Life: Possibility and Challenges

The important aspect of Kantian ethics is based on the principle that all human deserves to live dignified lives. No individual should be counted as a means rather everyone should be treated as ends in themselves. Considering each person's intrinsic worth and autonomy, Kant's deontological theory seems as the ultimate principle to follow. Immanuel Kant's ethical philosophy, particularly his concept

of duty, is foundational to deontological ethics. Kant argues that moral actions must be performed out of duty without bothering about the consequences. Duty, for Kant, is derived from the categorical imperative, which is a universal moral law that demands individuals act in a way that their maxims could become universal laws. This principle ensures that morality is based on reason and autonomy rather than personal desires or external influences. A categorical imperative, as discussed by Kant, elucidates just the very structure or form of a universally applicable law. To act ethically, is to follow the universal code of conduct. In this context, is morality defined from individual perspective of self-interest or overall interest? This seems as a difficult task to answer. Kant's notion of duty here promotes us to act following implementing impartial reasons i.e. without considering our own place in a situation. Such move reflects lack of emotional consideration where reason overrules emotion. The aim of this paper is to critically examine the practical application of Kantian deontology and its possible application in every day life.

Huma Namal, IIT Bombay

Title: Kant and Dynamic System Theory: Exploring the notion of purpose and autonomy in a self-organized system

This paper argues that the Dynamic System Theory (DST) is an appropriate tool to understand a human being as a natural end as described by Immanuel Kant in *Analytic and Dialectic of Teleological Judgement* (1954). Kant defines a natural end as a thing that is both the cause and effect of itself. Kant then goes on to declare that organism is a natural end or has a natural purpose - implying that the organism is a self-organized being. We find this very thought being at the heart of the conception of an autopoietic system, which is the foundation for the enactivist thought in cognitive science. We propose that the possibility of formulating a self-organized autopoietic system in virtue of mathematical tools such as DST, opens an avenue to argue that Kant's insistence on the notion of a natural purpose being regulative rather than constitutive is not warranted. This paper hypothesizes that the reason behind Kant's insistence that it cannot be a constitutive concept is the prevalent understanding of mechanics in purely Newtonian terms. Consequently, now that we have tools to study nonlinear dynamics, we can propose a system that can sufficiently be understood both as a cause and effect of itself - a self-organized autopoietic system. The paper argues

that an organism understood as an autopoietic system sufficiently meets the standards of a natural purpose in Kant. Having done this, the paper further explores the implications of this for the notion of autonomy and agency in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Sumit Pandey & Ranjan K. Panda, IIT Bombay

Title: Kant and Frege on the Question of Reducibility of Arithmetic to Logic

Are judgments of arithmetic synthetic or analytic? This question has opened up a philosophical debate between Immanuel Kant and Gottlob Frege. Frege opposes the viewpoint of Kant that the judgment concerning arithmetic is synthetic a priori and, on the contrary, maintains that arithmetical judgement is analytic a priori. In this connection, Michael Beaney (2006) claims that this is simply a disagreement regarding linguistic terminology, as both Kant and Frege agree that arithmetical truths are a priori and informative; so, it is merely a question of how one chooses to call them. Similarly, Nora Grigore (2022) claims that Frege is not arguing against the syntheticity in arithmetic but about how exact sciences should look (i.e. based on proofs). Opposing this position, we will argue that Frege holds an analytical model of arithmetic reducible to logic, which is also upheld by Philip Kitcher (1979). However, Kitcher claims that later Frege accepted arithmetic as synthetic, which is similar to Kant's conception of conceding the syntheticity of arithmetical judgement. Following this debate, we shall propose that Kitcher seems to have omitted the very distinction between empirical intuition and pure intuition. As a result, it appears that the philosophical stance of later Frege is similar to that of Kant. Moreover, it could be concluded that the philosophical position of early and later Frege on arithmetic is different from Kant's conception of arithmetic.