Abstract: Epistemic injustice—broadly, the failure to accord due credibility to a knower—pervades our everyday cognitive and social practices. While much of the philosophical literature has examined its testimonial and hermeneutical dimensions, I propose that its mitigation can be enriched by attending to a less explored phenomenon: attentional injustice. This refers to systematic neglect or undervaluing of open, broad attentional states, in favor of narrowly focused, task-oriented modes of awareness. Such neglect renders the human mind more vulnerable to entrenched cognitive biases, framing effects, and distortive heuristics, thereby indirectly sustaining epistemic injustice. I argue that rectifying attentional injustice requires strengthening what may be termed the experiential self—a mode of self-understanding rooted in direct, present-moment awareness, as opposed to the narrative or remembering self that is mediated by autobiographical memory and conceptual self-schemas. The experiential self, by foregrounding immediacy over retrospective construction, may enable a more accurate and less bias-prone engagement with others’ epistemic contributions.