Abstract:

In this paper, I intend to revisit a criticism that is often levelled against anekāntavāda (non-one-sidedness): whether it applies to itself? If anekāntavāda is about the denial of one-sidedness, then what is the status of such a denial? Is the denial itself absolute or conditional? If absolute, then it falsifies the doctrine itself; and if conditional, then it implies that not all one-sided views are considered false. In other terms, this is a case of the problem of self-reference. The critical task is to see then how conscious the Jaina philosophers have been with respect to the above questions. By bringing into discussion the ideas of 'absolute one-sided-views' (sarvathaîkānta) and 'qualified one-sided-views' (kathañcid-ekānta)—ideas which have not received much attention—and also by emphasizing the distinction between a true perspective (naya / sunaya) and a false-perspective (durṇaya), the paper argues that, since the earliest representations of anekāntavāda, the denial intended by the Jaina philosophers has been that of absolute one-sidedness and not of one-sidedness per se. The argument is based on a close reading of certain sections of the philosophical texts such as Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā, Siddhasena's Sanmati-Tarka and Akalaṅka's Rājavārtika.