Abstract: 

      We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are `leaked' with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and a random probability of leakage is encountered. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.

Short Bio:

           Saptarshi P. Ghosh has completed his PhD in Economics from the University of Birmingham, UK. He has an MA in Economics from the Pennsylvania State University, USA and a Masters in Quantitative Economics from the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata. He is currently working as an Assistant Professor in the department of Economics at the Shiv Nadar University, in Delhi-NCR. Saptarshi’s research interests broadly lie in the areas of Game Theory, Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics, Political Economy and Public Policy. In particular, he is presently working on issues relating to: Information Theory, Institutional Design, Voting, and Consumer Herding.