ABSTRACT:

       Can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from Condorcet cycles? In an oligopolistic market where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity or price decisions, we show that the majoritarian preference for the precision of public information is well-defined for consumers. For fairly general demand functions, we then characterize the Condorcet-winning precision of public information for consumers.  We report conditions on the demand function, the number of firms, and the mode of competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) under which the Condorcet-winning precision of public information for consumers (i) hurts consumers' surplus, profits or both, or (ii) remains conflict-free.

About the Speaker:

           Dr. Jaideep Roy has taught and researched at many Universities including Trinity College, Indian Statistical Institute, University of Birmingham, University of Surrey, University of Copenhagen, Warsaw University, Deakin University Melbourne and is currently at the University of Bath. His research has contributed widely to the areas ranging from Development Economics, Contract Theory, Bounded Rationality, Bargaining and Political Economy.  He has published widely in top journals and some of his research has found a place in courses on Microeconomic Theory or Political Economy.