Abstract:

       This paper analyzes conflict in a simple bargaining framework using an evolutionary approach to probe why parties fail to accept negotiated settlement and embrace fight despite the huge cost associated with latter. It shows that the destruction associated with fight which seems to be one of the factors deterrents to fight, may fail to act so in an evolutionary setting. When evolutionary forces shape the decisions of adversaries, they may not hesitate embracing even the actions that lower their own payoffs if they bring more harm to their rival players. This spiteful behavior, on the part of adversaries in finite population contest games, gives rise to a situation when adversaries are governed by  benefit (or harm) caused by fight relative to the opponent. It overall reduces the settlement possibility sets in an evolutionary framework and makes fight more intense between adversaries that are not equally vulnerable in fight. This paper also finds that in an evolutionary setting the norms for settlement becomes less effective compared to the case with Nash equilibrium.

Short Bio:

         Dr. Gopal Sharan Parashari is a visiting faculty of Economics in departments of Basic Sciences and Humanities and Management studies at Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Petroleum Technology, Amethi, Uttar Pradesh. His research interests include Applied Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Conflict, Political Economics, Economics of peer-to-peersystems. He has done his PhD from department of Economic Sciences at IIT Kanpur in the area of conflict economics. Prior to PhD, he has done MSc (integrated) from IIT Kanpur. His complete profile and publication record can be reached at http://www.rgipt.ac.in/gopal-sharan-parashari.html.