ABSTRACT: Is knowledge possible? This question has been perennially dogging the epistemologists. I contend that even if the sceptics deny the possibility of knowledge, it is incumbent upon both the camps to at least have aconsensus about what they mean by the term knowledge.Knowledge as “Justified True Belief” was accepted by the epistemologists more or less as the working definition of knowledge till Gettier showed that JTB astaken to be necessary and jointly sufficient conditions does not yield knowledge all the time. The subsequent analyses of knowledge tried to respond to Gettier’s challenge in one way or the other, and we all are aware of the history of it. What I am aiming at in this presentation is to put in my tuppence worth in to contribute to this ongoing debate.My focus is on one of the necessary conditions of knowledge, namely, truth. I would like to examine this condition in detail, and show some issues with this condition. Chiefly I aim to show that the proposition in question (which is supposed to be true) in order for it to qualify for knowledge raises some interesting problems. Occasionally the epistemic subject does not have adequate access to the truth of the givenproposition, but we would not necessarily object to the fact that the subject holds the given proposition to be true. I will put forth some thought experiments to bring this point home.Based on my thought experiments I will propose that the subject possesses an epistemic “right” to claim knowledge in certain circumstances till the future circumstance sublates the existing ones. I would conclude by proposing that S knows that P IFF S has a right to be sure that PS’s current epistemic circumstances are not sublated by future ones.