Abstract: Logically, deductive reasoning is a closed system and thus a goodcandidate for a cognitive module. However, neuropsychological researchinto the neural basis of reasoning has failed to identify a coherent module specifically activated during logical reasoning. Rather, the datapoint to a fractionated system that is dynamically configured in responseto certain task and environmental cues. We have explored four lines of demarcation (Goel, 2007): (a) systems for processing familiar andunfamiliar content; (b) conflict detection/resolution systems; (c) systemsfor dealing with determinate and indeterminate inferences; and (d) systems for dealing with emotionally laden content. Furthermore, meta-analysisstudies indicate that different logical forms (e.g. categoricalsyllogisms, conditionals, and transitive inferences) also recruit different neural systems. I will review this evidence and discuss theimplications for psychological theories of reasoning.

After receiving an undergraduate degree in architecture, Vinod Goel wenton to study cognitive science at Carnegie Mellon, Stanford/CSLI, and UCBerkeley, largely focusing on philosophical issues surrounding the nature of representation and computation. He did postdoctoral work at theCognitive Neuroscience Section of NIH/NINDS, and the Institute ofNeuroscience at UCL. He is a professor of cognitive neuroscience at York University, Toronto, Canada. His research focuses on the neural basis ofreasoning and real-world design problem solving, using lesion studies andbrain imaging techniques.