Philosophy of Psychology was an area of major concern and interest for Wittgenstein in the final years of his life. The phenomenon of aspect perception found repeated mention in his writings and lectures during this period. In this presentation, I explore Wittgenstein's notion of aspect perception and argue for a particular interpretationist reading of it. I argue that interpretation is transcendental to perception and that it works through conceptualisation of the impingements from outside the cognitive system in terms of the available concepts. I also aim to use the strength of this interpretationist reading of the notion of aspect perception to explore and situate Wittgenstein's views on perception. I defend the view that Wittgenstein's ideas on aspect perception are not meant to be observations on merely an atypical set of perceptions, a set of ambiguous duck-rabbit and other such figures. It only seems plausible that he was commenting on our ways of perceiving if we remember his habit of collecting unusual instances to comment on the ordinary. My proposal is that the discussions on aspect perception should be treated as a doorway to understanding Wittgenstein's views on perception. The stock of terminology that he invents in this connection also provides tools to explore the problematic of representational understanding in general and the purpose of philosophy at large.